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HOW THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
CAN HELP TO WIN GLOBALIZATION OF MORE
STAKEHOLDERS - BY MAKING MORE STOCKHOLDERS4
Robert Hockett
INTRODUCTION: THE QUANDARY OF PETER, PAUL & MARY
Global trade and investment liberalization present something of a
conundrum to those who are concerned with distributive justice and human
well-being. On the one hand, there seems no gainsaying that the gradual
removal of transnational trade and investment barriers is resulting in more
This piece may be viewed as the last in either or both of two, four-part sequences of
articles devoted to the tasks of envisaging means of financially engineering a more just
distribution of material opportunity and risk, both within polities and worldwide.
The first, worldwide sequence comprises of the following: Robert Hockett Three (Potential)
Pillars of Transnational Economic Justice: The Bretton Woods Institutions on Guarantors of
Global Equal Treatment and Market-Completion, 36 METAPHIL. 93 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett,
Three Pillars], reprinted in GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: ACHIEVING GLOBAL
JUSTICE (Christian Barry & Thomas Pogge eds., 2006); Robert Hockett, From "Mission-Creep"
to Gestalt-Switch: Justice, Finance, the IFIs and Globalization's Intended Beneficiaries, 37 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV.167 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett, Mission-Creep]; and Robert Hockett, Just
Insurance Through Global Macro-Hedging: Information, Distributive Equity, Efficiency, and
New Markets for Systemic-Income-Risk-Pricing and Trading in a "New Economy," 25 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 107 (2004) [hereinafter Hockett, Just Insurance].
The second, more domestically oriented sequence comprises of the following: Robert
Hockett, What Kinds of Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs, Other SOPs, and
"Ownership Societies," 92 CORNELL.L. REV. 865 (2007) [hereinafter Hockett, Stock Ownership
Plans]; Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and
Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American "Ownership Society,"
79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic]; and Robert Hockett,
Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett, Whose
Ownership?].
* Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Robert-Hockett@lawschool.cornell.edu.
SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per id=602726. Many thanks to
Jagdish Bhagwati, Jack Barcel6, Christian Barry, John Head, Sanjay Reddy, Chantal Thomas,
Joel Trachtman, . . . participants in the Developing Countries and the WTO Legal System
conference sponsored by ASIL and the University of Minnesota Law School, and participants in
the Law and International Financial Institutions conference held at the University of Kansas for
helpful comment, criticism and encouragement.
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rapid economic growth worldwide.' That growth, moreover, appears to be
lifting many once desperately poor persons out of their penury. 2 And all of this
appears to be happening much in the way-pursuant to the selfsame
dynamic-that students of political economy since the "classical" era of Smith,
Ricardo, and Mill have predicted.
Yet now on the other hand, there also would seem no denying that global
trade and investment liberalization have wrought losses at least as conspicuous
as the gains. And these do not accrue solely, or even mainly, to complacent or
plutocrat rascals-folk of the sort long since fingered by Smith and his "public
choice" school descendants, as being always the principal advocates of
"protectionist" policies of all stripes. For many, if not most, of the "victims"
of globalization seem to be those who until recently occupied positions much
like those now coming to be occupied by globalization's more sympathetic
beneficiaries. And this is, of course, the root of the quandary to which I refer.
For what are we to think of-how are we ethically to assess and regard-a
process that "robs," so to speak, faultless Peters to pay faultless Pauls? And
symmetrically, what do we make of a status quo ante that kept faultless Paul in
his poverty while benefiting faultless Peter?
Now one might suggest various means by which to address the dilemma I
mention-what I'll call "the assessment dilemma." One family of such means
in particular has been favored historically by most mainstream economists and
policy advocates since at least Bentham's day: One suggests, for example, we
seek means of commensurating the gains and the losses to Peters and Pauls,
then choose such policies as yield the greatest net gains or least losses.
Relatedly, as well as heuristically more conveniently, one might propose
fixating on some readymade index-global GDP, say for example, accruing
not only to Peters and Pauls, but now to less sympathetic, rich Marys as well-
then select policies best calculated to "maximize such readymade index" it. It
is truly remarkable, on reflection-and perhaps worthy of psychological study
some day-how many contributors to public discussion of globalization appear
to adopt points of view of this general type.
I do not think, though, that the proffered approaches to the assessment
dilemma of this species are apt to prove satisfactory for long, either
prudentially or ethically speaking. For as a prudential matter, perceivably
"robbed," faultless Peters cannot plausibly be expected to acquiesce in their
robbery indefinitely, simply because some of the spoils assist Pauls. This
seems especially so given the Peters' own recent history of struggle to win
wealth shares from less sympathetic rich Marys, who presently seem to be
benefiting along with-and indeed even more than-the Pauls at the Peters'
1. See, e.g. Trade Transforms Economies, Reduces Poverty, 2007 WLNR 18740481, Sept.
24, 2007.
2. See, e.g. Fact Sheet: Case for U.S. - Columbia Trade Promotion Agreement, 2007
WLNR 17864510, Sept. 12, 2007.
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expense. 3 More importantly still, as an ethical matter, neither robbed faultless
Peters nor anyone rightfully can accept, without alteration or emendation, a
systematic transfer from hypothetically faultless Peters to undeserving
Marys-if truly "faultless" such Peters and "undeserving" Marys they be. At
least that seems so if some workable, ethically ameliorative alteration lies to
hand.
I'd like in this Essay to design and discuss one such "alteration" that I
think might be open to us. I think that we might add some plumbing, so to
speak, to the processes of global trade and investment liberalization. It is
plumbing that re-channels some of the gains that those processes presently
channel away from the Peters to already advantaged Marys, back to those
recently and now seemingly again disadvantaged Peters. Think of it as
"bypass surgery," if you like, a bit of added arterial flow to ensure the heart's
healthy functioning. And if I am correct in my supposition, it will mean that
continued trade and investment liberalization can be made to benefit Pauls in a
manner that does not rob Peters or Marys. This proposed system will be
globalization that gives rise to unalloyed justice and wealth-gains.
"Magic?" one might ask. Well, no; finance. For the key, I believe, is to
channel some shares in the Mary's' trade- and investment-benefited firms to
the laboring Peters whom cross-border trade and investment are presently
tending to displace. If globalization misemploys faultless Peters, 'and if only
lesser paying jobs subsequently remain .... then make Peter part-owner of the
firm that has' discarded him. This is the prospect I would' like to explore.
The Essay proceeds, then, as follows: In the next Part, I flesh out in a bit
more detail who I mean here by "Peters," "Pauls," and "Marys," as well as
what I mean by "faultless," "deserving," and "undeserving" in characterizing
these personages. This serves to sharpen the quandary 'I have been talking
about, and to highlight some premises which I think underwrite that
quandary-premises which empirical work can serve either partly or fully to
corroborate or falsify. (My proposal can accordingly be taken as conditional in
nature: If the premises drawn out in Part I are correct-something I believe
plausible, but do not have space here to prove-then the proposal would seem
attractive.)
Part II then elaborates the structure of a familiar firm-share-spreading
prototype from which my own proposal less familiarly, but quite
straightforwardly, extends: I refer now to the employee stock ownership plan,
or ESOP. The ESOP, I believe, is woefully inadequate to the task for which it
was originally embraced by the U.S. Congress-the provision of income
security to U.S. laborers. But the financial structure of the ESOP, and that
structure's resonance with a number of deep-seated justice intuitions and
behavioral-psychological regularities, I believe, render it an ideal template
from which to extend when we seek means of channeling a share of the capital
3. On that recent history, see, for example Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote.
2008]
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gains currently realized by firm-owners who benefit by trade and investment
liberalization to laborers now being displaced by the same.
Parts III and IV carry out the project of analogical extension just
mentioned. I proceed in two steps: Part III shows how readily the ESOP form
can be varied simply by varying the patronage relations that both essentially
define and ethically underwrite it. Part IV then shows how readily laborers'
displacement by globalization-facilitated "outsourcing" can stand in as an
ethically compelling "shadow" form of patronage. If I am right about this,
then we appear to have here an elegant means both of addressing the
assessment dilemma with which I have opened this discussion and of winning
more friends for globalization worldwide than it currently has.
Part V then briefly addresses the central coordinating role the IFIs both
can and should take in facilitating and perhaps even administering such
programs as those I propose in Part IV. For, I argue, programs of this sort are
not only programs in respect of which the IFIs bear comparative advantage:
they also, and not accidentally, are precisely the sort of fare for which the
IFIs-especially the Bretton Woods IFIs-are designed in their globalization-
complementary roles. Indeed, I believe, facilitating such programs as 'these
would confer on the IMF and the IBRD roles relative to their earlier missions
quite analogous to that of the WTO relative to its stillborn forebear, the ITO as
envisaged in the founding era.
In the Conclusion, I briefly address anticipated objections and look
forward.
I. THE QUANDARY SHARPENED & DIAGNOSED
In order to render the considerations that prompt my proposal more fully
appreciable, I will first briefly identify what I think are the sources of the
assessment dilemma with which I opened. For there are, I believe, several
widely held assumptions that lurk in the background of much debate over
globalization. I think these assumptions both underwrite the quandary itself
and point, if they're correct, toward the best means of dissolving the same. I
also happen to believe they are plausible assumptions and indeed endeavor to
bear them out empirically elsewhere. Here, though, I have space only to state
them.
The first assumption is that there is, "out there in the world," so to speak,
a global endowment of "primal stuff," or of what I shall somewhat more
preciously call "ethically exogenous resources."4 These are things nobody has
4. This is the label I have given them, see, for example, Hockett, Stock Ownership Plans,
supra headnote. Some call them luck, some advantage, and others deem them resources.
Another name for that that I propose elsewhere is material opportunity. See, e.g. Hockett,
Mission-Creep, supra headnote. All of these variants work, but the later suggest the user of the
term is unaware that some resources, advantages, etc ... are themselves the product of responsible
action on the part of the beneficiary, in which case they are ethically endogenous and not the sort
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produced, and thus no one can claim credit for or ultimate ethical title to. They
jointly add up to a sort of "primal given," a substrate of basic resources from
which other things are made.
5
Informally and intuitively, we might at first pass think of this global
"stuff' as including inert and insipid material substances like petroleum, gas,
coal, copper, gold, and magnesium-all manner of useful, hence, valued
materials to which no one initially has any more legal or ethical claim than has
anyone else. At next pass, moving outward from heuristically easy examples
like those, we can enrich the description of "global stuff' by including what
might be called "cultural deposits." Here I refer to accumulated knowledge,
practical know-how, even the languages in which we generally think and
through which we communicate. 6 All things that have been left to us by our
forebears, which none of us has produced and yet many of us derive value
from-hence to which none of us bears any more prior ethical claim than she
can assert in respect of newly discovered mineral wealth-would count here.
These "deposits" too, I suspect, tend implicitly to be viewed as what I am
calling ethically exogenous. Their possession or otherwise is a matter of brute
luck. From an ethical point of view, they no more properly belong to one
person than to another. Access to such forms of wealth owes more to good
fortune in the "birth lottery" than to any form of creditably virtuous, value-
additive activity.
Now if it is plausible to partition things in this way-to maintain that
there is some such stock of ethically exogenous yet widely valued "stuff' to
which no one bears ethical claims prior to anyone else's-then it seems fair to
suppose something else: It seems fair to maintain that every human person-
everyone who is an appropriate subject of our ethical concern-is entitled in
justice to an equal pro rata share of this stock. That would seem a
straightforward consequence of our belief that all people are, ethically
speaking, created equal-i.e., that all are equally entitled to our ethical
concern. For such concern surely must include concern that persons bear
access to the stuff of which successful lives are made-call this "material," or
"substantive" concern. And in the case of that portion of such stuff for the
existence of which no one now living is responsible, equal such material
concern would seem to amount to concern for material equality. And this, I
suspect, is the second working assumption under which many people
attempting to think through the ethical significance of global trade and
investment liberalization operate. We tend intuitively to think of all human
beings as bearing, by way of birthright, a right to equal opportunity-not just
formal opportunity, but "substantive," material opportunity as well. And so we
of thing that concerns us here.
5. Hillel Steiner has a lovely, evocative name for it. He calls it the global fund. Hillel
Steiner, AN ESSAY ON RIGHTS 277 (1994).
6. For an exhilaratingly thoughtful discussion of the global advantages conferred by birth
into a language community, see DAVID SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK POWER AND GLOBAL
ARCHITECTURE (forthcoming from Yale University Press, 2008).
20081
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view them as bearing equal claims to what ever resources are out there, which
nobody now living is actually creditable with having responsibly brought into
existence.7
The first two assumptions are, of course, ethical-theoretic in nature. They
serve as postulates that could certainly be argued about, but in connection with
which argumentation would not involve much in the way of appeal to mundane
"facts on the ground." The remaining assumptions, by contrast, involve more
melding of theoretic with empirical elements: The third assumption is that the
endowment of global "stuff' to which I have referred per the first assumption
is not actually distributed equally in the pro rata manner described per the
second assumption. It is just not the case that every person actually holds her
rightful pro rata share of the world's ethically exogenous resources. Some are
born into wealthy countries possessed of abundant natural and even cultural
resources, the continuing in rem jurisdiction over or title to which is largely
enshrined in international law. 8 Some are born into wealthy families whose
familial wealth is protected-and nowadays decreasingly taxed-under
domestic property, tort, and even constitutional legal arrangements. 9 Other
people are faultlessly born without such advantages-some even born with
severe handicaps for which neither domestic nor international norms backed by
the force of law require or afford compensation. 10 Insofar as this is the case,
there are people with more than, and people with less than, what we would
think their rightful pro rata shares of the ethically exogenous global
endowment per the first two assumptions. Hence there is a gap between our
ethical "ought" intuitions and our present day "is" impressions. So runs the
third implicit assumption.
The fourth assumption amounts to a further specification of the third. It is
that we can partition the class of all persons entitled to our equal ethical
concern into the following four subclasses: Call the first class the "Ones."
These are all those who, per the second and third assumptions, hold more than
their ethically required equal pro rata shares. They hold more than what they
actually bear rights to hold, per the second assumption, of the ethically
exogenous "stuff." Perhaps they are born to rich families, in rich countries, or
both. They are lucky, favored by accident, by fortune. To be sure, much-
even very much-of their surplus might owe to their own laudably responsible,
value-additive efforts and hence, be viewed ethically as properly belonging to
them. The point here is simply that not all of it does in the case of the Ones.
The second class I'll call the "Twos." Twos hold more or less precisely
7. "God has bestowed this manna equally upon all of us," one might say.
8. See generally Robert Hockett, The Limits of Their World, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1720 (2006)
(reviewing Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)).
9. Id.
10. It could be argued that the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights . . . But thus far, the treaty does not appear to have been widely read-or at any rate
vindicated by state action-in so fulsome a manner. See id.
HeinOnline -- 17 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 300 2007-2008
HOCKETT: HOW IFIs HELP GLOBALIZATION
their rightful pro rata shares-not substantially more and not substantially less.
Then there is another class, call them "Threes," who hold substantially, but
perhaps not dramatically less than their rightful pro rata shares. And finally,
there are those I shall call "Fours," who hold much less than their rightful
shares of the global endowment. If born into, and confined to, highly arid
environments or violent and impoverished ghettos or enclosed refugee camps,
some Fours could even be called "Fives, ..... so to speak. And if born with
severe handicaps they might even be thought-depending upon whether we
account genetically transmitted "human resources" among the world's
ethically exogenous resources-to be "negatively" endowed. So runs the
fourth assumption, that none of the just-defined classes-especially not the
Ones, Threes or Fours-is null."
Finally, I think that there are three further, more quickly characterizable
implicit assumptions under which many of us who think about global trade and
investment liberalization tend to operate. The fifth assumption is the class of
Ones is roughly coextensive with the class of significant residual claimants on
and creditors of business firms-that is, with large-scale shareholders and
holders of significantly valued quantities of debt securities issued by firms.
The Ones, that's to say, are by and large substantial owners of and lenders to
firms. A corollary assumption, then, might be that significant portions of these
peoples' portfolios are inherited or otherwise plausibly regarded as windfalls.
But we'll see that no such corollary is necessary to what I'll be arguing.
12
The sixth and related assumption is that the classes of Twos and Threes,
together, are roughly coextensive with the class of minimal-shareholding or
non-shareholding workers, but either white collar salary-earning or union-scale
blue collar wage-earning officers or laborers for firms operating principally in
countries possessed of advanced economies. These folk, particularly the high-
waged and salary-earning among them, typically have been born into and
matured in the more or less nurturing and encouraging environments of well-
to-do households and neighborhoods, and have borne access to good
educations. They accordingly possess much in the way of well-developed
"human capital." But they possess less inherited nonhuman capital--creditor
and ownership interests in firms.'
3
The seventh, final and again related assumption is that the class of Fours
is roughly coextensive with the class of very low-wage earners. Often or
persistently unemployed and subsistence agriculturers, the Fours, by far the
12. There is substantial statistical evidence to the effect that the overwhelmingly greater
part of corporate securities-both equity and debt instruments-held by Americans are inherited.
See infra Part II; Hockett, Stock Ownership Plans, supra headnote.
13. The assumption here would not rule out non-negligible stock-holding and bond-
holding-either direct, indirect, or beneficial-by Twos and Threes. It is simply to the effect that
these groups' ownership and creditor stakes are very much less than are those of the Ones. For
empirical corroboration of this suspicion, as well as specifications of what direct, indirect, and
beneficial firm-owning are, please see infra, Part 111; and Hockett, id.
2008]
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greater part of all of whom inhabit economically underdeveloped countries
without access to valued resources, inherited wealth, or even effective political,
economic and social infrastructures or educational and other institutions.
"Social capital," we might say, is as scarce or as maldistributed as is "natural"
capital in the precincts inhabited by Fours, and so, in consequence, is "human
capital" too.14
Now here is the sense in which the seven assumptions just adumbrated
give rise to the quandary of Peter, Paul, and Mary with which I opened this
Essay-if the assumptions are more or less correct, then global trade and
investment liberalization will bear the following curious attributes: First, they
will tend most immediately to benefit the Ones and the Fours-in particular,
the Fours in the economically lesser developed jurisdictions where, by
hypothesis, most of the Fours live. For the firms owned and lent to by the
Ones are the first beneficiaries of liberalization; These benefits, realized
largely by hiring desperate Fours willing to work in unregulated environments
for low wages, go immediately to Ones. If that is correct, then the Ones are
those whom I called the "Marys" in the Introduction, and the Fours are the
"Pauls."
Second, if the assumptions are correct, trade and investment liberalization
will tend to benefit the Ones and the Fours at the immediate expense of the
Twos and the Threes-in particular, those in the economically well developed
jurisdictions where by hypothesis most of the Twos and Threes live. For as
firms realize growing profits by avoiding the labor, environmental, and other
regulatory regimes that once constrained them in the developed jurisdictions,15
the formerly salaried and higher-waged officers and other employees of these
same firms-Twos and Threes-lose increments of salary and wage, along
with other benefits, that earlier were won through precisely such domestic
labor and employee benefit legislation.16 So the Twos and Threes will be those
whom I labeled "Peters" in the Introduction; they largely finance the gains
realized by the Pauls and the Marys.
But now, if all of this is so, then it means that global trade and investment
liberalization, as presently conceived and carried out, are inherently afflicted
with an acute ethical ambiguity, if not a full-blown indeterminacy. And it is
precisely this ambiguity, I think, that ultimately accounts for the difficulty I
have described-the quandary that many of us tend to experience in
attempting to determine whether globalization is a good thing or not, and thus
what kinds of conditions, if any, should be imposed upon continued or further
14. See id.; Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra headnote.
15. It would happen, of course, in any of several familiar ways: Firms in the developed
world would outsource or threaten to outsource to less regulated jurisdictions. Firms in the
developing and less regulated world, for their parts, would export to the once-regulated developed
world and would do so cheaply by dint of the costs saved via non-regulation. And, of course, the
latter course strengthens the force of the former course.
16. 1 am ignoring longer-term "rising tides lift all boats" type claims for the moment.
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trade and investment liberalization.
Here, more precisely, is what I mean: Insofar as we are able plausibly to
restrict comparison to Ones on the one hand and Twos and/or Threes on the
other, simply leaving Fours out of account in a sort of ethical blind spot, there
is a straightforward ethical loss in the case of global trade and investment
liberalization. At least that is so in the short term, and probably it is so for
longer than that in view of both personal "retooling" costs and the relatively
brief length of a working life. 17 That is to say, if we forget about the Fours-if
we ignore the desperately poor, most of whom operate outside of the advanced
economies-it seems pretty clear that globalization is a bad thing. For we are
benefiting the Ones at the expense of the Twos and the Threes. And by
hypothesis, per the assumptions elaborated above, the Ones already are over-
endowed, the Twos are at best adequately endowed, and the Threes are under-
endowed. So redistributing from the Twos and the Threes to the Ones yields a
straightforward justice-loss. I suspect that many opponents of trade and
investment liberalization, at least those who oppose it without any misgivings,
think along these lines. It is the Fours who are hidden in their ethical blind-
spot.1
8
Now if, by contrast, we restrict comparison to the Twos and/or Threes on
the one hand and the Fours on the other, leaving the Ones out of account in the
ethical blind-spot, then we face the prospect of an unambiguous sort of justice
gain wrought by global trade and investment liberalization. For the "degree"
of global injustice-the justice-shortfall, so to speak-can be viewed in this
case as being now partly made up. Ethically exogenous global "stuff' is more
nearly equalized between Twos, Threes, and Fours, while before the twos
were, by dint of mere luck, better off than the Threes, who, by dint of mere
luck, were better off than the Fours. And if we've forgotten about the Ones,
this greater degree of equalization-which, again, is equalization only of that
which by hypothesis, per the first two assumptions elaborated above, is
ethically required to be equalized, namely ethically exogenous global "stuff'-
will perforce be viewed as a straightforward justice-gain.
It seems to me that it is indeed the Ones whom we tend to forget when
those who advocate or defend global trade and investment liberalization say,
"Well, think about all those desperate global poor." These folk are of course
partly right: We should be thinking about the desperate global poor-those
I've been calling the Fours-but the Ones are left out of our account in this
case, and they shouldn't be.
17. See, e.g. Hockett, Just Insurance, supra headnote.
18. It might also be argued, of course, that they ignore the lowering of prices, which
benefits "everybody." I don't think that's a very good argument, though-precisely because
everyone benefits in this sense. The benefit here is quite thinly spread, whereas the harms that
these people are concerned about are quite thickly concentrated--on precisely the wrong people.
He who loses his income and cannot retool is not consoled by the fact that his poisonous
toothpaste or his child's toxic toy now will cost pennies less.
2008]
HeinOnline -- 17 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 303 2007-2008
304 KANSAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. XVII:2
On the other hand, by contrast, people also are right when they say, in
effect, "Well, what about the local Threes, who would be Fours had it not been
for the gains we have made in regulatory development, in labor legislation, and
the like since only the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the "developed"
countries? They should not be left out of our account either." And of course
these people also are right. And the fact that both sides are right in respect of
their distinct and non-coextensive constituencies, while both sides are wrong in
respect of the union of those spheres, is the cause of the quandary-what I
have called the assessment dilemma.
Now, if I am right about this, then it would seem that we are ultimately
faced both with a challenge of vision and, yet more urgently, with a challenge
of action. For if my diagnosis is correct, then the only way adequately to
address the quandary would seem to be, first, to keep all relevant parties-the
Ones, Twos, Threes, and Fours-simultaneously in view when assessing and
structuring global trade and investment liberalization; and second, to seek
means of ensuring that Ones but not Fours share the gains wrought by trade
liberalization with Twos and, especially, Threes. And that second task is in a
sense more urgent than the first because, unless we can find such means, we
shall never escape the quandary itself, which amounts to a case of ethical
indeterminacy wrought by incomplete specification of the assessment
domain-missing Ones or Fours. For there just seems no way to judge, under
the aspect of justice, when a justice gain wrought by transfers from Twos or
Threes to Fours is swamped by a justice loss wrought by simultaneous
transfers from Twos or Threes to Ones.'
9
Unless we add what I called in the Introduction some "pipes" or "arteries"
that connect global Ones to global Twos and Threes, thcn we are effectively
attempting to deal with a trivalent problem by means of a two-variable
formula. Only by adding a variable do we render the problem soluble. And
only in that way, accordingly, do we ensure that globalization might constitute
a straightforward ethical gain.
Now I think, per that last observation, that we do have the requisite
"piping" at hand. In the remainder of this Essay I shall accordingly attempt to
schematize it. The key is to start with a quite familiar means by which the
U.K. and U.S. already endeavor to make "capital"-owners of "laborers"-if I
may employ the classical terminology-and then to adapt the structure to our
present purpose. I'll do that in Parts II through IV. Then, in Part V, I shall
seek to explain why I think my proposal amounts to an ideal means by which
the Bretton Woods IFIs can play precisely that WTO-complementary role that
the founders of all three institutions envisaged now over sixty years ago.
20
19. One might seek to escape the prescriptive indeterminacy by falling back upon a
maximizing rule, of course, as countenanced above in the Introduction. But then one will have
relinquished the effort to conform one's prescriptions to what is distributively just.
20. I am, of course, treating the WTO as the embodiment, more or less, of what the Bretton
Woods founders envisaged for the then planned International Trade Organization (ITO), which
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II. A SUGGESTIVE BUT INCOMPLETE PROTOTYPE: THE EMPLOYEE STOCK
OWNERSHIP PLAN
Intriguingly, Americans have as a society made some tentative efforts at
making capital-owners of laborers. The principal means up to now has been
the public favoring-'through tax policy-of employee benefit plans under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).2 1 Yet the ultimate aim
here, as ERISA's full title suggests, is mainly to encourage and protect
investment for one limited purpose-retirement security. 22 There is one partial
exception, however: The employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) was
originally designed, and continues to be advocated, at least partly, as a means
to foster the pre-retirement owning of firms by employees. Although I
describe elsewhere that this is an overly-modest aim, here I am concerned
more with how the aim is affected, and why we seem willing to affect it in the
manner we do. The mechanics and politics here would seem to be
generalizable in ways that might benefit all of those whom I have been calling
"Twos" and, especially, "Threes." I plan to exploit that generalizability below.
A preliminary terminological point before we proceed: In speaking of
ESOPs (or "plans"), one can be speaking of any of several distinct, cognate
kinds of financial arrangement. 23  All, as befits their shared name and as
intimated above, are meant to facilitate laborers' acquisition of shares in the
firms for which they work.24  By far the most common such set of
arrangements, however, and the one that will engage us here, is the so-called
"leveraged" ESOP.25 This, as the qualifier suggests, is the plan that employs
credit in the share-acquiring process.
26
had to wait fifty years for its effective implementation. See generally Hockett, Mission Creep,
supra headnote.
21. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1001-
1461 (1994). See also JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 68-84 (3d ed. 2000). I ignore here such proposals as that to diminish or even
eliminate capital gains taxation. Such proposals appear to be aimed at-and doubtless would
have the effect of-more rewarding of those who already own than fostering wider ownership.
22. Congressional action culminating in the passage of ERISA was precipitated by the
folding of the Studenbaker corporation, which, it was subsequently discovered during bankruptcy
proceedings, had grossly underfunded and indeed raided its employee pension fund, leaving the
suddenly unemployed pensioners doubly berefit. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 21. Those
familiar with recent bankruptcies, particularly in the airline industry, might be tempted to say plus
can change.
23. See JOSEPH R. BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? 64-84 (1988)
for a brief cataloguing of ESOP types.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. The principal non-credit-employing ESOPs-so-called nonleveraged ESOPs, tax-credit
ESOPs (aka TRASOPs), and payroll ESOPs (aka PAYSOPs)-are briefly elaborated in BLASI,
id. at 78-84.
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A. What: Simple Mechanics and Spread
Here is what the leveraged ESOP27 does: The employing firm adopts an
ESOP as a sponsored ERISA plan-a defined contribution plan.2 8 Like other
ERISA plans, the ESOP takes the legal form of a trust.29 It is a distinct, even if
firm-sponsored and ultimately board-directed, entity formed to acquire and
hold stock on behalf of employees. Its administrator, though named and
directed by the sponsoring firm's board or a committee named thereby,30
accordingly bears fiduciary obligations to those employees.31
Partly in exchange for a promissory note, the trust borrows funds from a
bank or some other commercial lender.32 It uses those funds to purchase stock
issued by the sponsoring/employing firm at fair market value.33  The loan
proceeds accordingly pass through the ESOP to the sponsoring/employing firm
itself-they finance it, we'll see-and the stock is then held in trust on behalf
of the employees. The firm guarantees repayment of the loan by the ESOP to
the lender, and the stock held in the ESOP is itself pledged as security.
Over time, the sponsoring/employing firm makes cash contributions to the
ESOP; just as it would do in connection with any defined contribution plan. In
this case, the contributions are used by the ESOP to amortize the loan
originally used to purchase the sponsoring/employing firm's shares. 34 As the
loan is paid down, stock held by the trust is gradually released from its loan-
27. The transactions which follow are related, in slightly differing order and somewhat less
detail, in EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
PROGRAMS 121-22 (3d cd. 1987).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6) (2000). Defined contribution, or "DC" plans, are to be
distinguished from so-called defined benefit or "DB" plans. The former prescribe a schedule of
payments made into an account for the benefit of the employee, who in turn bears both upside
gains and downside losses realized by her investment portfolio over time. DB plans, by contrast,
prescribe payments made to the employee upon her retiring, and the employing firm, or the
insurance company from whom the firm purchases annuities on behalf of its employee
beneficiaries, in effect bears the aforementioned upside gains and downside losses realized by the
fund out of which payments are made.
29. §§ 1104(a)(1), 1103(a). The idea, of course, is both to insulate funds earmarked for
employees from the other financial operations of the firm and to afford the employee
beneficiaries the benefit of fiduciary obligations owed them by the plan's trustee. It is regrettably
not clear, however, that the trust protections offered employees by pension trusts are as fulsome
as those offered beneficiaries of other trusts. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d
745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that ERISA defines "fiduciaries," "fiduciary functions," and
"fiduciary duties" more narrowly than does common law trust doctrine).
30. § 403(a)(1). A partial exception, which need not detain us, is found at § 403(a)(2).
31. § 404(a)(1).
32. I say "partly" for reasons that will be made plain over the next several sentences.
33. Because the shares are purchased at fair market value, the purchase is sometimes
misleadingly described by ESOP-proponents as an equity-injection. We'll see what actually
happens is that publicly subsidized debt finance is accompanied by a stock giveaway.
34. So the sponsoring/employing firm is, in effect, both borrowing and paying back on
behalf of employees for the purchase of its own stock-it gives out partial ownership of itself as
an employee benefit. There's the dilution (of previous owners), more on which presently.
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securing role to individual accounts maintained severally on behalf of the
employee/beneficiaries. 35 Stock is released to those accounts in proportions
that track the beneficiaries' labor-patronage of the firm (their wages or
salaries). Diagrammatically, this is exhibited in Figure 1:
FIGURE 1: INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A LEVERAGED ESOP
ARRANGEMENT
[ffiJ
I TimRo .....
Now, not surprisingly, in view of the arrangement's financial structure, 36
this all proves to work rather well as a method of getting more "capital into the
hands of labor" (as well as: more debt financing to the firm). Some statistics
are telling: By 1986, twelve years after ESOPs had attained congressional
endorsement in ERISA, nearly five thousand firms had adopted plans.37 About
twenty-five percent of those plans held more than twenty-five percent of the
outstanding stock of their firms, and nearly two percent of them owned all such
35. Typically, the shares become saleable or redeemable only upon retirement or exit of the
firm, and, typically, the firm buys them back. There are voting restrictions (even to the vanishing
point) as well, as we'll see presently. This is all significant when it comes to the question ofjust
what "owning" should mean here; but that isn't our question in this Article. See Hockett, Whose
Ownership?, supra headnote, for more on that question.
36. With one possible-though minimal--caveat to be noted below, the
employee/beneficiaries neither pay nor pledge anything. The firm, in effect, does it all, or nearly
all, as we'll see when we turn to the government's role.
37. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 105 (1996).
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stock. 38  By 1990, over twelve million laborers-about ten percent of the
workforce-in over ten thousand firms had come to participate in ESOPs.39
By the late 1990s, ESOPs were estimated to account for just under four
percent of corporate equity-holding in the United States.40 The rate of ESOP
growth, moreover, by this point had come to average between three- and six-
hundred new plans per year, accounting for between three- and six-hundred-
thousand new employee participants per year.4 1 Among sponsoring firms over
the past thirty years have been such American stalwarts as Avis, the Chicago
Tribune, Delta, Federal Express, General Motors, Kraft, Maytag, Polaroid,
Procter & Gamble, Quaker Oats, United Airlines and Xerox.42 Even skeptics
of ESOPs, and of the oft-seemingly "crackpot" financial pronouncements of
the ESOP's inventor, Louis Kelso, 43 readily acknowledge their "rapid
proliferation," 44  hence that "[s]omething is happening that requires
attention." 45  But what is it that is happening, and why might it require
attention? What do the telling statistics actually tell?
ESOP promoters tend to speak of ESOPs' successes as though all were a
"natural" function of superior financial engineering, the "self-liquidation" of
"capital mortgages," and the incentive effects that growing ownership imparts
to laborers. Thus Louis Kelso: "[T]he corporation and its employees can
achieve [through ESOP-financing] several hundred percent greater efficiency
in the use of corporate earnings for capital purposes than through conventional
... financing. 4 6 And Kelsonian acolyte Stuart Speiser: "Th[e] new capital...
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., id.; UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 10-i, 20 (Corey Rosen &
Karen M. Young eds., 1991); THE EXPANDING ROLE OF ESOPs IN PUBLIC COMPANIES 23-27
(Karen M. Young ed., 1990); DAVID P. ELLERMAN, THE DEMOCRATIC WORKER-OWNED FIRM
110(1990). See JOSEPH RAPHAEL BLASI & DOUGLAS LYNN KRUSE, THE NEW OWNERS 257-301
(1991).
40. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, STATISTICAL PROFILE OF
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP (1997). The Center estimates that nine percent of equity is employee-
owned, with profit-sharing, 401(k) and stock option plans accounting for the non-ESOP balance.
It should be noted that about four percent of ESOPs are estimated to be terminated each year.
41. Id.
42. Rosen & Young, supra note 39.
43. Kelso routinely announced such putative discoveries such as "Say's Law" is being
"violated" in modem capitalist economies, contemporary economists remain wedded to the labor
theory of value, and that there are "two factors" that enter into production, capital and labor, with
the first of those accounting for an ever-growing share of value added. See generally Hockett,
Jeffersonian Republic, supra headnote, at 124-42. Economists do not appear to have found these
discoveries compelling. I should perhaps not be as snarky as I might here seem, however.
Kelso's motives, energy, and inventiveness, as distinguished from his sallies into theory, were
nothing if not worthy of praise. And he was a lawyer and investment banker, not an academic
theorist, typically pitching his advocacy to legislators and the general public rather than fellow
theorists. See generally STUART M. SPEISER, A PIECE OF THE ACTION: A PLAN TO PROVIDE
EVERY FAMILY WITH A $100,000 STAKE IN THE ECONOMY (1977).
44. HANSMANN, supra note 37, at 105.
45. ELLERMAN, supra note 39, at 120 (emphasis omitted).
46. LOUIs 0. KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POWER 62
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pay[s] for itself out of the increased profits flowing from expanded
production., 47  And the ever-perky business journal, Inc.: "[T]here's
considerable evidence that eliminating the employee mentality and creating
companies of businesspeople, of owners, has become a kind of Hidden Secret
of Success in the American marketplace."
48
The mentioned evidence is hardly "considerable": At best it is thin and
ambiguous. 49 Nor does presently leverage-bought ESOP capital "pay for
itself' in much more than a trivial sense: It is far from clear that the dividend
streams and/or capital gains that attend ESOP stock would dependably pay off
the term loans without help of the kind we shall presently describe. And the
"several hundred percent greater efficiency," which quantity incidentally is,
like many Kelsonian magnitudes, arrived at by altogether unspecified means, is
hardly "natural," "economic" or "financial" in any pre-legal or pre-political
senses of the terms. For the real "Hidden Secret of [ESOPs'] Success," it turns
out, is no more obscure than the tax code, ERISA, and combined corporate
governance and takeover law: The leveraged ESOP as currently constituted is
essentially a public benefit conferred through private channels.
B. How: Private Channels, Public Benefits
Consider first a few tax and ERISA advantages. These, working in
tandem, presently account both for the aforenoted "greater efficiency" of
ESOPs as financing tools, and for ESOP stock's apparent capacity to "pay for
itself." They also afford incentives to the lenders themselves, as well as to
non-ESOP shareholders from whom an ESOP might seek shares:
1. Tax Advantages
Probably the most efficacious tax advantage that leveraged ESOPs
uniquely confer upon sponsoring/employing/issuing firms comes via the
Revenue Code's permitting them to deduct contributions made to their plans.
The firm may deduct contributions, to an amount up to twenty-five percent of
all compensation paid a plan's participants, from its taxable income.5 ° That
advantage works jointly with ERISA's relaxing, in the case of ESOPs, the now
customary mandatory-diversification understanding of the so-called "prudent
investor" standard to which employee pension trusts ordinarily are subject: In
non-ESOP cases, ERISA requires that employee trusts be broadly invested; a
plan will not typically be permitted to hold much of the sponsoring firm's
(1986).
47. STUART M. SPEISER, supra note 43, emphasis supplied.
48. John Case, A Company of Business People, INC., Apr. 1993, at 79, 86.
49. See BLASI, supra note 23, at 25-27, 221-38 for plenary, and not unsympathetic,
discussion of what evidence there is.
50. IRC § 404 (2000). ESOPs enjoy other tax advantages enjoyed by employee pensions
more generally, most of which are noted below, but our focus will nevertheless be primarily upon
what is unique to ESOPs.
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equity.5 1But ESOPs are exempted from this standard, 52 meaning that the firm
which sponsors a leveraged ESOP can eat the cake and keep the penny: It
enjoys the tax favor bestowed upon contributions to its ERISA plans, by
further financing itself through new share issuance.
The aforementioned "further financing"-the "purchase" of newly issued
shares by the legally distinct trust for the employees-as noted, is leveraged.
But, that simply means that the firm is effectively financing itself with debt
while enjoying a publicly afforded tax break in doing so, in return for affording
employees new stock. And, as it happens, the lender supplying the leverage
for ESOPs is tax-favored too: Ordinarily, its taxable income is the interest
received on lent funds.53 But, on a loan to a leveraged ESOP, fifty percent of
that interest historically has been excluded.54 So, in effect, the legislated
favors conferred upon ESOPs amount to significant government-subsidized
debt-financing of ESOP-sponsoring firms, in a manner intended to encourage
those firms to make partial firm-owners of firm-employees.
But wait, there's more: Ordinarily, dividends paid out to the holders of
firms' shares are drawn from firms' after-tax incomes.5 5 Dividends paid on the
stock held in an ESOP, however, are deductible from taxable corporate
income. 56 Capital gains reaped by the trust also go untaxed; they are' deferred
compensation. 57  The tax code also affords incentives to non-ESOP
shareholders to transfer their shares to the ESOP: For one thing, under
specified conditions a shareholder in the sponsoring firm who sells shares to
the ESOP may defer any taxable gain that she gleans through the sale.58 For
another thing, fifty percent of the proceeds from sale of a sponsoring firm's
stock to its ESOP are excludable from estate taxation.59 And finally, a
decedent's estate may avoid tax-induced liquidity problems by shedding a
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2000).
52. § 1104(a)(2). At least that is ordinarily the case. Courts have in some instances agreed
with the Department of Labor that there can be circumstances in which the prudent investor
standard would require the ESOP trustee to refrain from purchasing employer stock. See, e.g.,
Herman v. NationsBank Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354 (1 lth Cir. 1997); Moench v. Robertson, 62
F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1995); Kuper v. lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995). § 1104(a)(1).
53. IRC § 61(a)(4) (2000) (including "interest" in the general definition of gross income).
54. § 133(a). But see Small Business Job Protection Act §§ 1602(a) and (c) (repealing the
interest exclusion previously allowed under IRC § 133(a) for all securities acquisition loans made
after August 20, 1996, except for loans made pursuant to a binding written contract which was in
effect before June 10, 1996).
55. This is true "by definition," so to speak-the revenue code's definition of corporate
taxable "income." See § 311 (a) (providing that a corporation may not deduct dividends from its
gross income).
56. § 404(k).
57. §§ 501(a), (c)-(d). This advantage is not unique to ESOPs as distinguished from other
ERISA plans.
58. § 1042 (Among the conditions are that proceeds of the sale must be reinvested within
one year in a domestic corporation, and that after the sale the ESOP will own at least thirty
percent of the sponsoring firm's shares).
59. § 2057.
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portion of its estate tax liability to an ESOP, provided that it convey to that
ESOP shares in the sponsoring firm of equal value in exchange.
60
2. Additional ERISA Advantages
There are further ERISA advantages, in addition to the just noted tax
advantages, designed to encourage ESOP share-acquisitions from non-ESOP
shareholders in the sponsoring firm: Pension plans ordinarily are barred from
purchasing sponsoring firms' shares not only from the sponsoring firms
themselves, but also from all so-called "parties in interest"--directors, officers
and principal shareholders. 61  But, ERISA exempts ESOPs from that
standard.62 ESOPs also may borrow from such parties in interest in order to
acquire employing firm stock.63
3. Publicly Conferred Governance Advantages
There is more to our public benefit story than just tax and ERISA
inducement. A cluster of governance advantages offered by ESOPs, in this
case working through (once again publicly afforded) corporate and securities
law, offers incumbent managers and otherwise satisfied shareholders 64 an
added array of incentives: First, the firm's immediate issuance of new shares to
a nominally independent "third party" ESOP dilutes more than the monetary
value of older shares; it dilutes older shares' voting power as well.65 That
makes it harder for unsolicited would-be acquirers to assemble a controlling
bloc of shares. And this issuance legally can in fact be immediate, indeed even
in express contemplation of an impending takeover bid. Thus has held the
Delaware Chancery.
66
If the new employee/owners had been reliable voting allies to the would-
be firm-acquirers, of course, the ESOP's promise as a takeover defense would
be attenuated. But as it happens, the new employee/owners are not, interest-
wise, reliable such allies at all; indeed quite the contrary. Employee
preferences scarcely matter in these cases for the new employee/beneficiaries
of leveraged ESOPs do not typically receive voting rights, at least not right
away. 67  That in itself constitutes, of course, another incentive for ESOP-
60. § 2210.
61. § 4975.
62. ERISA § 408(e).
63. ERISA § 408(b)(3), I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3).
64. Including many newly owning employees, were they able to vote their shares. More on
this "were they" presently.
65. I say "nominally" independent here partly owing to the role of the sponsoring finn's
board in selecting and directing, indeed even functioning as, the ESOP trustee, see infra note 114,
and partly owing several ESOP governance features to be noted presently.
66. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989). But see
NCR Corp. v. Am. Tele. & Tele. Co., 761 F.Supp. 475 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
67. A few details will be in order here. Most stock held by ESOPs considered in aggregate
is nonvoting stock: The median ESOP holds ten percent of its sponsoring firm's shares, but only
five percent of that firm's voting rights. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYEE STOCK
OWNERSHIP PLANS: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF ESOP TAX INCENTIVES FOR BROADENING STOCK
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creation-an incentive enjoyed by the managers: ESOPs work to free
managers' hands from such dissatisfied shareholders-including any employee
shareholders-as there might be. So it seems more than likely that the ESOP's
utility in warding off takeovers, and its strengthening managerial hands, might
also account for the proliferation, in significant measure, of ESOPs'. And that
utility itself, again, like the favorable tax and ERISA treatment, amounts to a
public benefit. It is sanctioned and indeed affirmatively encouraged by
legislation and court decision alike.
4. Bringing It All Together: A Telling Counterfactual
It surely cannot be objectionable, then, to suggest that the legislative and
judicial favoring of ESOPs-hence ESOPs' amounting to a public benefit-
might be playing a role in their spread.6 8 But we quickly can sharpen and
supplement, as well as summarize, the point here by appeal to a stylized
scenario: We'll suppose there is no tax- or ERISA-favoring of finance of the
firm through the ESOP; the same loan on the same terms can be had by other
means. We'll also assume that ESOPs offer no governance or takeover-
avoidance advantages. We'll further suppose that employees do not temper
their wage demands by dint of their ESOP benefit; their new shares are "all
gravy." And finally we'll suppose that our laborers' gradually growing
"ownership" does not appreciably boost shop-floor morale, hence productivity
and firm-profitability. Under these circumstances, what is happening in Figure
1, above? It seems pretty clear: The firm, via the ESOP, is financing its
projects by borrowing and repaying; while it happens to be issuing new stock
to employees who pay nothing. But that means the value of pre-ESOP shares
is diluted by the value of the newly issued ESOP shares, with no offsetting
advantages enjoyed by the pre-ESOP shareholders. Why don't the latter
object?
There are less proximate political answers, I believe, to which we shall
turn in a moment. But the more immediate reason of course is that several of
the aforesaid suppositions, as we have seen, do not obtain. There are
considerable tax, ERISA, and governance advantages gleaned through ESOPs.
There is also some evidence that employees do temper wage demands in view
OWNERSHIP 39-40 (1986). How can this be? First partition the class of ESOPs into those
sponsored by closely held, and those sponsored by publicly traded, firms. Now consider the first
of those subclasses: With little exception, closely held sponsoring firms enjoy all applicable
ESOP tax benefits even if their ESOPs do not pass acquired stick voting rights through to
employee/beneficiaries. The only exception is in respect of voting as to "fundamental"
transactions-matter which must, according to charter or applicable law, be decided by
supermajorities of outstanding shares voted. I.R.C. §§ 409(e)(3), 401(a)(22). Next the second
subclass: While in the case of publicly held firms voting rights must in fact be passed through to
the employee/beneficiaries, that is so only in respect of stock actually allocated to employee
accounts. § 4975(e)(7). But the allocation occurs only gradually as the original loan is amortized.
Note also that this lack of control rights ought to give pause to those who would see in the current
"ESOP revolution" any real harbinger of an incipient "workplace democracy."
68. I am far from the first to suggest the importance of public support for the spread. See,
e.g., BLASI, supra note 23; HANSMANN, supra note 37; ELLERMAN, supra note 39.
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of the ESOP benefit-that there might even be an implicit bargain to this
effect-but this can be no more than a small part of the story.6 9 Only the
supposition that growing ownership fails to make much difference to
productivity appears, in the light of what evidence we have, to be by and large
correct. So the tax, ERISA and governance advantages-the cluster of public
benefits--enjoyed by ESOPs must surely be critical to their spread. Pre-ESOP
shareholders, at least the less other-regarding ones, 70 are willing to endure the
dilution of their shares wrought by leveraged ESOP transactions. And they are
willing to do so precisely because the now much more cheaply (because tax-
and ERISA-favorably) debt-financed firm is sufficiently more valuable, in
consequence, as wholly or partly to offset the dilution. To whatever degree
those shareholders are not wholly compensated, the control benefits, imparted
by ESOPs to management, make up the difference; any dissatisfied
shareholders are weakened by the court-sanctioned ESOP transactions.
C. Why: Accounting for the Favor
So now assuming, plausibly it seems, that law-conferred tax, ERISA and
governance benefits constitute a, if not the, critical reason for ESOPs'
proliferating, we are faced with another question: Why is this public favoring
of ESOPs politically accepted in the U.S.? Doesn't the support tamper with
"natural" market forces, and isn't distortion of this sort disfavored? 71 I think it
is here that we-or at any rate those who would seek to render global trade and
investment liberalization more unalloyedly just-shall find the successes of
ESOPs instructive. For there are mutually reinforcing ideological and
endowment-psychological reasons that appear to account for the U.S.'s public
favoring of ESOPs, and even indeed for the private favoring of ESOPs as well.
1. Core Values: Responsibility & Equal Opportunity
The key to the ESOP's political success probably lies in its giving
expression to a cluster of interlinked ethical-cum-political values and
endowment-psychological dispositions that are shared by a broad swathe of
Americans and, I suspect, persons worldwide.72 Values-wise, we are most of
69. For one thing, the evidence is scant. See ELLERMAN, supra note 39, at 90; BLASI, supra
note 23, at 263. Perhaps more importantly, as a theoretical matter it sees highly unlikely that
rational employees would be willing to reduce their wage sufficiently to offset the dilution. The
diluting shares issued them are, after all, deferred compensation. And as we'll see they confer
none of the consumption benefits of control. And finally, of course, they are undiversified
investments. It would be far more sensible for employees who were willing to sacrifice pay for
stock to insist upon voting, and/or diversified stock, hence not to offer any sacrifices sufficient to
offset the dilution of their own firms' owners' stock.
70. The other-regarding ones might partly be actuated by the ideological/political
motivations that we shall discuss presently.
71. Certainly some seem to think so. See, e.g., Michael W. Melton, Demythologizing
ESOPs, 45 TAX L. REv. 363 (1990); Richard L. Doernberg & Jonathan R. Macey, ESOPs and
Economic Distortion, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103 (1986).
72. For more on the invariance of these dispositions across cultures and subcultures, see,
e.g., Robert Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A Meta-Theory of Justice, 26
CARDozo L. REv. 1179 (2005).
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us opportunity-egalitarians: 73 We believe that what people have should ideally
be traceable to equal initial holdings of such ethically exogenous resources-
favors of fortune, of chance or mere circumstance, the global "stuff' of Part
I-as no one now living is responsible for having created.74 And we believe
that departures from that baseline ideally would be the product of value-
additive or value-detractive effort-of choice rather than chance-for which
people are responsible.7 5  It is tempting to think of access to value-adding
opportunity-hence to business capital as well as to dwelling space and basic
human capital-as part of that ethically exogenous endowment to which all
should ideally enjoy access. 76 Ethical intuitions such as these, I conjecture,
underwrite the first several assumptions that I noted in Part I, to be implicit in
the thinking of many of us who find globalization ethically perplexing.
2. Endowment Dispositions: Loss-A version & "Handout"-A version
Endowment-psychological dispositions-wise, we are apt to experience
some methods of redressing imbalances in the distribution of that
aforementioned exogenous endowment as less discomfiting than others. 77 So,
for example, our more self-regarding, less altruistic selves are apt to be
friendlier toward distributing perceivably "new" resources to the presently
under-endowed, than toward "taking" already held resources for redistributive
purposes. 78  Those same selves will regard a perceived "refraining from
taking" from the under-endowed as preferable to a mere "giving" to the
same.79  And finally, the self-regarding will be more amenable to any
perceived "giving" to the degree that it can be framed more as a rewarding-
hence as ethically endogenized, i.e. earned or deserved by the recipient.
80
3. How the SOP Structure Conforms
The leveraged ESOP coheres rather nicely with these values and
dispositions. It spreads a basic endowment which it is not difficult to view as
being, at least in part or potential, ethically exogenous. 8 1  It spreads that
73. See Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote; Robert Hockett, Minding the Gaps:
Fairness, Welfare and the Constitutive Structure of Distributive Assessment (Cornell Law Sch.
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-039), available at http://ssrn.com/author-602726.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote.
78. Id. I employ scare-quotes here to register the fact that the "newness" and "taking" in
question are experienced as such pre-reflectively, as their proceeding from cognitive dispositions
would suggest. We are speaking of predisposed framings here rather than considered judgments.
79. Id. Similar remarks hold of the scare-quotes here as of those in the text accompanying
the previous footnote.
80. Id.
81. It is in part or potential ethically exogenous in two senses, one trivial, the other less so.
First, one must use it responsibly in order to derive "utility" from it; it is a kind of resource.
Second and less trivially, the quantum of this resource that one has it at least in part - and
sometimes indeed in significant part - the product of fortune or fate rather than effort. One can
hold less than another simply by dint of having been born to the wrong parents, so to speak. See
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endowment by distributing what can saliently, if nevertheless superficially, be
viewed as "new" capital-newly issued shares in firms. 82 It does that partly in
what resembles a return for reward-earning effort-labor patronage or work
for the firm.83 And it encourages private such rewarding (on the part of lenders
and otherwise-diluted shareholders) largely by refraining from perceived
taking (i.e., through tax breaks) rather than transparent taking and giving.
In a way, then, the leveraged ESOP replicates, in piecemeal and
somewhat more convoluted fashion, the same strategies that the U.S. has
employed more elegantly in connection with publicly facilitated home-
spreading and education-spreading since the early-mid-twentieth century.
84
And this appears to be no accident, for there is considerable historical evidence
suggesting that the ESOP was expressly inspired by the federal home finance
programs set in place during the 1930s and 1940s.85  There is also good
evidence to the effect that both these and the federal education finance
programs set in place over the 1960s and 1970s were found appealing to
legislators and public alike precisely in owing to their resonance with the
values and dispositions just rehearsed.86
But then this raises a further question: Might the idea of the leveraged
ESOP itself be leveraged yet further, in a manner that enables those whose
incomes are disrupted by trade and investment liberalization to be readily
compensated? Might the salience of the employment relation that appears
ethically to underwrite the ESOP's popularity carry-over to more attenuated,
even severed, employment relations? I think that it might, and I now turn to
that prospect.
III. MORE SOPS FOR MORE FOLK: ADAPTING THE STRUCTURE TO OTHER
PATRONAGE FORMS
Let us begin by reminding ourselves that labor with a firm-the
employment relation-is an ethically salient patronage relation.8 7  It is an
ongoing relational mode between persons and firms. 88 And it is a relation that
generally Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote, at 31-51.
82. See supra Part I.B. "Superficially" in light of what we saw supra, Part I.B.
83. That is to say that it is viewed as an "employee benefit," as something predicated upon
lengthy labor-patronage for-a kind of "loyalty to"-the firm. More on this infra, Part V.
84. See Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra headnote, at 98-120, 143-53.
85. See id. at 135-37.
86. See id. at 98-120, 143-53.
87. So far as I have been able to determine, the only scholar who has devoted much
discussion to the relations between patronage and firm ownership is Hansmann. See HANSMANN,
supra note 37, passim. My employment of the concept of patronage will be somewhat more
elastic than Hansmann's, however-as is perhaps intimated by my addition of the qualifier
"ethically salient." My understanding of the term will accordingly be bit different as well. I do
not believe, however, that my understanding and employment of the term will be incompatible
with Hansmann's.
88. Hansmann appears to be less explicitly concerned with the "ongoingness" of patronage
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appears to afford sanction to the conferral of benefits upon persons. 89  It
renders the latter apparently earning or deserving of the benefits bestowed
upon labor through leveraged ESOP financing. 90 That was one upshot of Part
II.C above.
Labor is also but one way in which people relate themselves ongoingly to
firms. And this raises an intriguing prospect: Perhaps we might rely upon
patronage relations additional to, or that vary upon, the employment relation in
order to warrant the public facilitation of share-spreading-in particular, to
those we have called "Peters," or "Twos" and "Threes" above. This Part
proposes and assesses a few possibilities, meant to be suggestive rather than
exhaustive. The idea is to approach the particular plan I wish to propose by a
brief sequence of suggestive steps.
A. A First, Simple Variant: Customer Stock Ownership Plans
One conspicuous form of patronage in some respects reminiscent of labor
is ongoing customership. 91 Some firms from which we purchase goods and
relations, while being more explicitly concerned with a particular species of relating to the firm-
viz., selling to or purchasing from it-than I. See infra note 117. I think our distinct concerns
with patronage nonetheless compatible, however. For, first, my concern with the possible ethical
salience of patronage naturally lends itself to an emphasis upon longer-term relations, at least
among those who purchase from or contribute to firms in small increments per transaction.
(Duration of relating substitutes for magnitude of individual transaction.) And, second, I think
patronage relations as potentially involving more than purchasing and selling alone to be implicit
in Hansmann's own understanding of the term, as evidenced by Hansmann's occasional recourse
to the broader relational concept of "supplying," which figures prominently in his treatment of
stock-holders as financial capital suppliers. See HANSMANN, supra note 37, at 12.
89. Hansmann defines "patrons" as "persons who transact with a firm either as purchasers
of the firm's products or as sellers to the firm of supplies, labor, or other factors of production."
Id. at 12. Much of the thrust of Hansmann's often astonishingly insightful monograph is devoted
to showing both (a) that it is typically a particular class of patrons which owns most of the firms
operating within a particular industry, and (b) why it is that the particular classes which tend to
own in particular industries end up being the more efficient owners. My interest in this Article,
though not, I think, incompatible with Hansmann's interest, is nonetheless distinct; and the
distinction accounts for my somewhat broadened understanding and employment of the concept
of patronage. My concern is with patronage as a form of ongoing relation between persons and
firms such as can be viewed in part as the patron's consistent conferral of some manner of benefit
upon the firm, such as in turn can engage our willingness to view the patron's coming to own a
share of the firm as ethically unobjectionable-as something better than the product of a mere
"handout." That is to say that my angle on patronage here is as a "desert basis"-I do not believe
that this basis for interest in patronage places me in any way at odds with Hansmann's efficiency-
grounded basis for interest in the same. For I do not here suggest that firms should be owned by
patrons of a different kind than those that he shows to be the more efficient owners of firms in
particular industries. Rather, I simply propose that more patrons within the class be added to the
rosters of owners. The remainder of this Part, I believe, will both make this plain and unpack
more fully the ways in which patronage relations might be seen ethically to underwrite benefit-
conferrals upon current non-owners within patronage classes.
90. Please see the discussion in Part II.C, supra, which suggests reasons why we publicly
favor ESOPs.
91. Indeed, in some industries customers constitute the most efficient class of firm-owners.
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services are firms from which we regularly purchase them. In some cases that
consistency is attributable to something like customer loyalty-an investment
of trust, rather than labor, in the firm. In other cases the "loyalty" is perhaps
not what we should call voluntary, but reflects a lack of available
alternatives-our being held hostage, so to speak. And there are of course
middling cases between the extremes-unthinking habit or ignorance of
alternative supply sources, for example. In all such cases, however, we can
plausibly imagine the relation to be sufficiently salient, from an ethical point of
view, as to warrant at least some degree of public facilitation of patrons'
gradually coming to own parts of the firms that they regularly patronize. 92
Consider a homespun example: There might be a small university town
centrally located, hence perhaps geographically isolated, in a large U.S. state.93
People who live and work in the town see a lot of each other, and come to feel
a palpable sense of community in consequence. They feel this not only in
relation one to another, but even in relation to the relatively small number of
retail establishments that sell to the townspeople. Buyers and sellers are all
thrown together, and even feel "centrally isolated" together-perhaps even
miss this feeling when they're away.
Now, a marvelous new grocery store complex comes to this town.9 4
Everyone talks about the new store and even shows it off to visitors and
prospective new residents. They're as proud as they are pleased, that at long
last it's arrived.95 Nearly everyone living or working within several miles of
Examples are the farm supply industry, in which consumer cooperatives constitute an oft-
encountered firm form; rural electricity, in which customer cooperatives again figure
prominently; clubs that afford their members high-status "associative goods," which again tend to
be owned by their members; and urban housing, in which housing cooperatives figure
prominently. See generally HANSMANN, supra note 37, at 149-223.
92. Again, sometimes this happens quite "naturally," for reasons that appear to be rooted in
the comparative efficiencies of governance and contracting. See note xx, supra. But the reasons
for interest in an "ownership society" warrant our considering the fostering of ownership even
where it does not quite "naturally" arise, which of course seems to be what has occurred in the
case of ESOP proliferation. See supra, Part III. Those same reasons presumably afford at least a
preliminary answer to prospective objections rooted in the same normative source as are familiar
objections to disgorgement remedies in contract owing to their inefficiently coupling purchases
from with investments in firms. See Hockett, sources cited supra headnote. And thank you to
Daniel Markovits for pressing me here.
93. I am of course thinking of Ithaca, NY, where I live. But there are countless similarly
situated locales, not all of them university towns and not all of them as relatively isolated as
Ithaca. Indeed this example might also be plausibly applied, say, to a community-like
neighborhood or sector of a large city, such as is commonly found in New York, Chicago, and
Los Angeles. Please also bear in mind that the example following this one will make no
reference to community-like towns at all. All examples in this Article are meant to be illustrative
and suggestive, even to spur additional visualizations; they do not purport to be exclusive or
exhaustive.
94. 1 am of course alluding to Wegman's in Ithaca NY. This firm is not publicly traded, so
I am asking that the reader pretend that it is.
95. It's one of those towns that has difficulty attracting and keeping nationally, and even
regionally known merchant establishments.
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the town now purchases groceries at this store, leave and pick up their dry
cleaning there, do their banking there, even leave their children to be attended
there while transacting. Things might develop and go on in this way for years.
That's an ongoing, many-faceted relation.
Now suppose that we found the recently floated American idea of an
"ownership society" to be an attractive one, for any number of reasons,96 and
so thought that it might make for good public policy to encourage wider
ownership of firms. In that circumstance, might we not find it politically
acceptable, indeed affirmatively attractive, to work to encourage the voluntary
spread of shares in this store or its holding company among the regular
customers who live in community with and partly organize their lives around
it, just as we do in the case of employees? We certainly might.97
Consider a cognate example, applicable perhaps to larger metropolitan
areas or wider regions now in addition to smaller communities: There might be
a product or service the supply of which enjoys increasing returns to scale. It
is a "natural monopoly." 98 Perhaps it's a transport system, an electrical power
grid or high-speed intemet network-a public or publicly regulated utility.
Customers of the firms that supply such products and services, whether
identified by reference to towns, cities or larger regions serviced by these
firms, might often find themselves more or less "stuck" with their suppliers.
They have little choice but to patronize them. That's a large part of why we
regulate them. But might the same rationale not then warrant our facilitating
the customers' gradually coming to own them, at least in part? Surely
customer hostagehood is at least as ethically salient a patronage-form as is
more voluntary customer loyalty, isn't it?
Were we to endorse this line of thinking, then we might well decide it
worthwhile to consider facilitating the acquisition of shares in the firms-the
grocery store or the utility-by their patrons in much the way we facilitate
96. I consider the variety of grounds upon, and the three principal American political
traditions to which, the notion of an "ownership society" might be attractive in Hockett, Whose
Ownership?, supra headnote, at 5-78.
97. It is of course not the case that facilitating ownership of local businesses will afford
optimal diversification. After all, personal incomes and the incomes of town-sharing or region-
sharing firms can to some extent co-vary-in the case, for example, of local or regional slumps.
But I ask that the reader bear with me a bit longer. As examples proliferate below we shall see
that diversification grows. Moreover, our aim here is to make use of patronage relations as
ethically salient grounds for public action facilitating ownership, pursuant both (a) to the
hypothesis posited concerning why the public is willing to subsidize ESOP expansion, see supra
Part II.C, and (b) to the further elaboration of that hypothesis in this Article's predecessor pieces,
concerning why we have acted similarly to promote home-owning and higher education
spreading in the way that we have done. Finally, please note that I have already addressed the
project of democratizing income-risk-sharing across localities and even across nations in a
separate article: See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra headnote, at 212-56. My hope is that all of
these pieces together afford at least a rough template for how best to render our society more
"owning," more risk-spread-efficient and more just.
98. In a way, of course, so was the store in the previous example. Small towns support less
competition among smallish suppliers than do cities.
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share-acquisition in firms by employees. We might tax-break-assist firms in
debt-financing themselves, in exchange for their issuing shares to trusts whose
beneficiaries gradually came legally to own what initially they would
beneficially own. (Again, perhaps, as in the labor case, in proportion to their
patronage-e.g., amounts purchased from the firms in place of wages earned
working for firms.) In essence, then, we would just replicate the financial
structure of the leveraged ESOP arrangement. Only the particular patronage
relation would change. We might call it a "Customer Stock Ownership Plan,"
or "CuSOP." 99 Imagine it as in Figure 2:
Figure 2: Institutional/Financial Structure of a CuSOP Arrangement
Error!
common
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Of course some things even apart from the differing patronage relation
that ethically grounds it would be different here relative to the ESOP as
presently constituted. There is no, say, federal "CRISA" for "customer benefit
plans," for example, in the way that there is an ERISA structure upon which
ESOP programs partly are built. Nor, accordingly, does the revenue code
currently include any provisions that might encourage firm-financing through
CuSOPs as it does in the case of ESOPs. But that is all beside the point. The
point is that all of the means by which we currently facilitate stock-acquisition
by employees could be legislatively replicated to facilitate stock-acquisition by
long-term customers-loyal customers, hostage customers, or "in-between"
99. This SOP is not to be confused with a "consumer stock ownership plan" proposed by
Kelso, which latter appears to be little more than a producer co-op. See KELSO & KELSO, supra
note 46, at 67-73.
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customers. And the public benefit that such legislation would effectively
confer-like that which public facilitation of ESOPs confers-would be
warranted, could be advocated, and presumably would be politically embraced,
on much the same grounds as ethically salient patronage.
B. A Second, More Complex, & More Pertinent Variant: Rent-Recouping
Stock Ownership Plans
Let's try another one, one that I think takes us rather closer to the plan
that I wish to propose for those "Twos" and "Threes" disproportionately
harmed by global trade and investment liberalization: Sometimes new
resources are discovered. Petroleum reserves are found in Alaska, newly
exploitable minerals are found in beds of magnesium nodules just off the coast,
some portion of the electromagnetic spectrum becomes usable in a way that it
was not before, etc. Sometimes no living person or group of persons is
creditable with the discovery, or with the discovery's full exploitability. But
some such person or persons often can be partly so credited. And the
"Western" and, especially, "American" way of doing things in any event is to
permit private agents-generally firms-to exploit the new possibilities-to
appropriate rents from them. 00 So we want some of the value of the new
resources-rents-to flow very quickly into private hands, even while not all
of that value seems to be deserved by those parties.
What should we do with the surplus? We might "windfall profits" tax it,
but that might resemble a kind of incremental taking,101 and the takings go to
the government. Westerners, and especially Americans, don't seem to like that
kind of thing any more. 10 2 At any rate they don't find it as palatable as they
once did, perhaps because they are less trusting of the users of the "takings-
"the government'"'--than they once were. 10 3 But Americans in particular still
like ownership-they like that very much, in fact-and they are aware that by
definition nobody has earned a windfall. So why not widen the distribution of
shares in the firms that are authorized to exploit the new opportunities?
100. The appropriable rents justification for property rights appears to originate, at least in
its now canonical formulation, with Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57
AM. ECON. REV. PAP. & PROC. 347 (1967).
101. Legally speaking this claim, associated with Richard Epstein, is of course hyperbolic.
But one can readily grasp the intuition that underwrites it. For the hyperbole, see, e.g., RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
102. See, e.g., id. (providing a representative screed). See also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN
SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005),
for a morbidly fascinating, indeed chilling, documentary account of the exploitation of citizen
cognitive error by champions of the tax-evading wealthy.
103. I employ scare-quotes here because I am simply conveying, rather than participating
in, that attitude pursuant to which some view the government as an alien force rather than an
agent of collective action. Perhaps the current iteration of this line of hostile thinking all began
with the disillusionments of the 1960s, which seem to have fed directly into the populist "tax
revolts" of the 1970s, out of which so much of current rightward-leaning ideology seems to have
grown.
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So far, so good. But this still leaves open the question of patronage. To
whom should the shares be distributed? Is there some perceivably "natural"
class of patrons whose beneficiary status would be as readily warranted as that
of employees and long-term customers? After all, we would presumably not
wish simply to replace one class of windfall beneficiaries with another, as it
were at random. How, then, to think about this? I think we might employ a
sort of "sliding scale" here. And indeed this might be a nice way gradually to
generalize the original ESOP idea all the way out, so to speak-i.e., to move
incrementally in the direction of broad global recognition that good citizenship
and faultless wage or salary loss themselves constitute an ethically salient kind
of patronage.1
0 4
Let's think along those lines for a moment: Some new resources might be
broadly perceived as bearing some special nexus to the places where they are
found. Such places, in turn, might be perceived as being somehow ethically
"closer" or legally "more proximate" to-as it were "more owned by""-their
residents than by nonresidents. 10 5 So, for example, new oil found in Alaska
might be perceived as being somehow, somewhat more saliently Alaskan even
than American. And Alaskan citizens might accordingly be thought to stand in
a somewhat-even if but incrementally--closer patronage relation to any firm
granted rights to exploit new Alaskan oil reserves than are non-Alaskan
Americans. 10 6 Alaska itself is constitutionally permitted, after all, to tax firms
that extract Alaskan oil reserves, even after the (federal) IRS has done so. So it
must be the case that we tend to view the citizens of political units as being
somehow more privileged than non-citizens in respect of the benefits brought
104. This suggestions is taken up infra Part V.
105. Scare-quotes again indicate that I am attempting to give expression to a pre-reflective
manner of perception. I should note here that I am exceedingly uncomfortable with this particular
perception, and experience resort to it to be a compromise with territorialist psychological
dispositions that are regrettable at best. But bear with me for a moment. Some such primitive
intuition as this seems to underwrite the judgment that coal found between Canada and Mexico is
"American" coal, rather than North American coal or "the coal of mankind," for example. Ideally
I'd prefer to repudiate the intuition, but if we're stuck with it then we may as well harness it to
good purpose.
106. In 1978 and 1980, voters' initiatives were introduced to establish the Alaska General
Stock Ownership Corporation (AGSOC), which would have provided Alaskan citizens ownership
interests in the Alaska Oil Pipeline. Pursuant to a tentative agreement with the British Petroleum
Company, the latter was to sell its interest in the Alaska Pipeline to AGSOC. AGSOC would
have enjoyed the backing of state credit to borrow. Under federal matching legislation-
specifically, Subchapter U of Chapter 1 under Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code-AGSOC
would also have enjoyed favorable federal income tax treatment. See Revenue Act of 1978, Tit.
VI, 92 Stat. 2885 (1985). The AGSOC plan also would have prohibited any one individual from
taking ownership of more than ten shares, in order to prevent concentrated ownership. See
William Greider, Alaska, Inc., an Economic Experiment; Senator's Plan Would Distribute State's
New Wealth to Citizens; Alaska Inc., an Experiment in Distributing New Wealth, WASH. POST,
Oct. 22, 1978, at Al. The Alaskan ballot measure nevertheless lost on a close popular vote
(approximately 78,000 to 72,000). See, e.g., Alaska Division of Elections,
http://www.gov.state.k.us/ltgov/elections/initbal.htm; and The National Initiative for Democracy,
http://www.ni4d.us/people/gravel2.htm. Notwithstanding the failure of the ballot initiative,
Alaska did adopt a cognate program.
20081
HeinOnline -- 17 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 321 2007-2008
322 KANSAS JOURNAL OF LA W & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. XVII:2
by the resources that are found and exploited within the geographic boundaries
of those units. Cognate observations to these "Alaskan" observations might
hold true in respect of magnesium nodules found off the coast of Washington,
Oregon and California. And international law of course treats things much in
this way on a nation-by-nation basis.
Now let us bring these patronage considerations together with the earlier
rehearsed "windfall" considerations. Would it be too far a stretch to require, as
a condition for granting the rights to exploit the new resource to the firm, that
the firm distribute shares in itself to the residents of any municipality or state
with which the new resource is widely perceived to be especially closely
associated? (E.g., residents of any municipality or state that currently might
tax the enterprise that exploits the resources?) Note that if the answer is "no, it
would not be a stretch," then we might not have to bother with tax or other
incentives at all. Or how about this: We combine tax and other incentives with
the "carrot" that is the prospective new resource exploitation itself, in a manner
that enables us to lessen the former relative to what they were in the ESOP and
CuSOP cases. We thereby less expensively (to the public) encourage both (a)
the entry of firms to do the exploiting, and (b) those firms' spreading their
shares. Call it a "RentSOP."' 7 It might look like this:
107. This is not to be confused with Kelso's proposed "RECOPs," "GSOPs" or
"COMCOPs," which, though apparently geared toward spreading ownership of some firms
cognate with those under consideration here, are both (a) argued for on entirely different - indeed,
puzzling grounds, and more importantly (b) presumably for that reason, differently financial-
structured. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 46, at 75-83, 88-92, 99-103. See Hockett,
Jeffersonian Republic supra headnote at 124-42 (providing a more general charitable
interpretation and correction of Kelsonian "theories" and schemes).
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Figure 3: Institutional/Financial Structure of a RentSOP Arrangement
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That's right. This is the same diagram as Figures 1 and 2, with state or
local citizens standing in as patrons now instead of employees or customers.
(So now the degree of patronage might track years of residence.) 0 8 What is
different, apart from the changed patronage basis here ethically grounding the
public benefit, is simply that the tax and other benefits afforded by the public
are less than before, since the exploitation rights are themselves a benefit.
(That is entailed by the "windfall" considerations.) The loan made to the
RentSOP trust might of course have to be participated as well, since possibly
in this case unlike the ESOP and CuSOP cases it would be too large for any
one lender to make. 10 9 But all of that is, again, for present purposes neither
108. I ignore, for present purposes, the matter of crafting terms so as to avoid conflict with
court decisions overturning interstate-travel-burdening state laws, decided under the Commerce
Clause of Article I of, the Privileges and Immunities or Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to, or some "penumbral emanation" from those or other provisions of the
U.S. Constitution. In Zobel v. Williams, the Supreme Court rejected Alaska legislation that
awarded pipeline dividends to state residents based on the duration of their residence up to the
point at which distributions began. 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982). But allowing the number of shares
distributed thenceforth to grow with years of residence would not seem to be constitutionally
offensive so long as one could begin to accumulate shares immediately upon taking up residence.
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941).
109. Not just as a matter of capacity, but as a matter of law as well, the Bank Code's
lending limits could kick-in. See 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1994). 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1) (1994) requires
that outstanding non-fully-secured loans and credit extended by a national banking association to
an individual, including a trust, not exceed fifteen percent of that banking association's
unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus. 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(2) (1994) additionally requires that
2008]
HeinOnline -- 17 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 323 2007-2008
324 KANSAS JOURNAL OF LA W & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. XVII:2
here nor there. The important point presently is that the firm still finds itself
debt-financing itself on favorable terms in the interest of boosting its capacity
to exploit the newly exploitable resources, and spreading ownership in itself-
hence the benefits that accrue to its owners by dint of its access to the
resources-in the process.
Now note, in connection with our hope of maximizing both the number of
possible beneficiaries and the number of firms that beneficiaries might
gradually come partly to own, that we can readily broaden our understanding
of "local resource." Matters here, in connection with CuSOPs in JII.A above,
are candidates for RentSOPs that can be proliferated.
We might broaden our understanding of "local resource" along at least
two dimensions. For one thing, we can move outward from locality to region
to nation or economic class-a prospect that we shall consider presently. For
another thing, we can plausibly broaden our understanding of what constitutes
a "resource"." For it isn't always a matter of found objects or substances, after
all. A highly desired set of geographic coordinates might count as well-say, a
"prime location" upon which some highly remunerative piece of commercial
real estate stands. That is a paradigmatic case, in fact, of "rent." And renters
who hold exclusionary rights to highly desired spaces are rather like the
"natural monopolists" considered in connection with CuSOPs above at Part
III.A. That's why the so-called "classical" economists, pioneers like Adam
Smith and David Ricardo, were so suspicious of them.110 But we needn't be
suspicious. We can facilitate the spaces' voluntary sale and purchase at fair
market value instead, by broad classes of locals, simply by treating the spaces
like oil reserves or magnesium nodules, and the firms that operate them like
resource-extractors, in Figure 3 just above.111 "Don't get mad." we might say,
total outstanding fully-secured loans and credit extensions made by a national banking association
not exceed ten percent of the association's unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus.
110. See, e.g., 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 161-63 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976) (stating rent as a monopoly price
and not consequent on any expense laid out by the rentier); DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPALS
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 33-45 (J.M. Dent & Sons, 1973) (1817) (regarding
rentiers as windfall beneficiaries of scarcity).
111. Hansmann suggests a number of reasons for the absence of urban utility coops
analogous to rural electrical coops; among them are the comparative transience of urban dwellers
relative to rural dwellers and conflicts of interest among disparate classes of prospective urban
owners. HANSMANN, supra note 40, at 173-79. While such phenomena presumably account in
part for the absence of spontaneously generated (sorry-pun foreseen but not intended) urban
utility cooperatives, they do not, so far as I can see, stand in the way of publicly facilitated partial
ownership of corporate utilities by their customers. Moreover, to whatever degree we might
worry that partial ownership by customers is "not enough," we can readily mitigate the worry by
means familiar to other, existing utilities-ownership scenarios. Hence, rates can be regulated with
a view to preventing price-discrimination as among classes of user; and any worry over the
development of, say, "absentee ownership" in the long run would seem to be mitigated or
mitigable by (a) the fact that highly transient residents of a municipality likely will not come to
acquire much in the way of shares in any event, (b) the possibility of recourse to required
redemption-indeed, we might even arrange to have transients trade their erstwhile utilities'
shares for shares in utilities located in their new locales, with the utilities themselves in turn
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"get owning-get the company."11 2
Turning from the resource dimension to the locality dimension, if we
move outward from seemingly "locally located" resources to more diffuse such
resources--e.g., new portions of the electromagnetic spectrum-we can move
outward along the patronage dimension as well. We'll thereby draw-in more
beneficiaries, more potential owner-beneficiaries of the firm's privileged
access. So we might imagine, say, that the US's Telecommunications Act of
1996113 is amended to work somewhat differently than it actually has done:
Congress might not have authorized the FCC simply to grant existing
broadcast companies new "advanced spectrum," without requiring payment
therefore.' 14 Instead it might have established a sort of "national RentSOP" on
behalf of all citizens, and then offered the combined inducement of occupancy
over the HD bandwidths and some (diminished) tax incentives to get the firms
to spread shares in themselves to the citizenry. That would not only be a
readily intuited extension from the more "locally located" RentSOP idea; it
would also amount to a convenient bridge to a yet more universal SOP still.
IV. A SOP FOR PETER: "GLOBAL" STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS
All right, let's turn now to those whose plight occasions our concern in
this Essay, Part I's "Twos" and, especially, "Threes""-those whom we also
called "Peters." Might we not view their heightened labor income risk as a
particularly poignant variation on the employment relation itself which
ethically underwrites the ESOP, as discussed in Part II? And, might we not
also view the income gains realized by "Ones" through globalization as a
species of rent as discussed in Part III? I think that we might.
For consider: If, per hypothesis, Peter truly is "faultlessly" misemployed
in consequence of global trade and investment liberalization-because more
desperate Paul can work for less-and if Peter is aging hence truly unable to
exchanging the shares, or at worst (c) the possibility of recourse to mere beneficial ownership by
the new owners. Indeed, as Hansmann himself points out, some municipal utilities can be readily
likened to cooperatives, organized, as they are, quite similarly. Id. at 177.
112. A variation, perhaps, on the 1979 Remington electric razor advertisement, in which
Victor Kiam averred, "I liked it so much, I bought the company." See BBC News, I Liked the
Slogan So Much.... May 30, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/1357091.stm.
113. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). For commentary, see PETER W. HUBER ET AL.,
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 (1996); and 74 AM. JUR. 2D Telecommunications §
16 (2001).
114. See 47 U.S.C. § 336(a) (2000) ("[T]he Commission .. . should limit the initial
eligibility for such licenses [for use of advanced spectrum] to persons that (1) are licensed to
operate a television broadcast station or hold a permit to construct such a station ... and (2) shall
adopt regulations that allow the holders of such licenses to offer such ancillary or supplementary
services on designated frequencies as may be consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
necessity."). For a discussion of the FCC's grant, under the Act, of a free spectrum for HDTV,
see Matthew Spitzer, Dean Krattenmaker's Road Not Taken: The Political Economy of
Broadcasting in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 353, 365-67 (1996).
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"retool" himself sufficiently fully as to recover all of his lost income through
new forms of employment, then he bears a particularly poignant, and surely
ethically salient, relation to his erstwhile employer.1" 5 The latter, and hence
the "Marys" who own the employing firm, have shed him-who recall, by
hypothesis is faultless-precisely in order to capture the surplus that is'
generated by paying less in the form of wages and regulatory compliance to the
more desperate "Pauls." Peter's labor patronage has effectively been replaced
with a sort of "shadow," or "ghost" labor patronage: His erstwhile relation is
extinguished, and Peter accordingly harmed owing to no fault of his own.
Now note that Mary, for her part, is no more ethically creditable than
Peter is faultable: For again, by hypothesis, Mary has simply inherited a
goodly portion of the firm-shares that she owns, or of the wealth she had'
expended to purchase them. And the capital gains that now will accrue to
those shares in consequence of global trade and investment liberalization are
no more the result of her value-adding effort than were those that accrued to
her by dint of her being born into wealth. They are the consequence of
changes in the global legal environment, with which most Marys had nothing
whatever to do. From Mary's perspective, therefore, they are windfalls. They
are rents flowing her way, in virtue of no more than her exclusive possession
of that which was given her at birth. Ethically, they're on all fours with
mineral deposits or petroleum reserves discovered beneath her inherited real
estate holdings.
Now, if these considerations are in order, then do not our core values-
our opportunity-egalitarian sense of justice as elaborated above at Parts I and
II.C-suggest that we view Mary as properly bound to share some of her
globalization-wrought, windfall gains with Peter? And won't Mary, in turn, as
well as the rest of us, per our endowment dispositions discussed in II.C, view
the most readily palatable means of facilitating that gain-sharing as that
involving the issuance of new shares, by the globalization-benefiting and
Peter-misemploying firms, to Peter? Of course, that will dilute the value of
Mary's shares in the firm. But this is simply another way of saying that it will
amount to Mary's sharing her globalization-wrought gains with those Peters
whom her globalization-benefiting firms have laid off. And as we noted above
at II.C, sharing of this sort is much less likely to be experienced as "taking"
and "redistributing" than are "taxing and spending."
How, then, would a SOP configured in conformity to these observations
be structured? Well, in light of the sample SOP-variants laid out in Part III, I'll
wager it's easy to visualize now. Indeed, think of it simply as a
straightforward variation on the Rent-SOP itself described just above. Treat
new access to global intermediate product, capital and labor markets as the
"resource." Treat those who are misemployed by firms accessing those newly
115. I discuss such "retooling" costs, along with other determinants of Peter's faultlessness,
at considerable length in Just Insurance, Jeffersonian Republic, and What Kinds of Stock
Ownership Plans Should There Be?, supra headnote.
HeinOnline -- 17 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 326 2007-2008
HOCKETT: HOW IFIs HELP GLOBALIZA TION
opened markets as the natural constituents-analogues to the "citizens of
Alaska" countenanced above in III.B. (We can presumably employ the same
means for determining that Peter was indeed misemployed owing to trade
liberalization, and thus an appropriate beneficiary, that we employ currently in
determining whether employees hard hit by trade liberalization are entitled to
"adjustment" relief). Let years of employment with such firms serve as
degrees of patronage-an ethical-intuitively attractive suggestion from "two
angles," as it were, in this case: For not only is it the case that more years
laboring for the laying-off firm render the patronage relation appreciably
"thicker" or "deeper""-something akin to the "loyalty" that we interpreted as
ethically salient patronage in connection with CuSOPs in III.A. It's also the
case that more years' labor with the laying-off firm mean less time for Peter to
"retool" and find new employment.
All right, so far so good, I take it. Now, here is something that perhaps I
have not unobjectionably left out: It isn't the case that Peter is misemployed
only to the benefit of compatriot Marys owning compatriot firms, is it? After
all, Peter's firm might not simply "outsource" Peter's labor. It might go out of
business, being out-competed by foreign firms. Those firms are held largely
by foreign Marys, of course-indeed, in some cases even foreign governments.
Moreover, since global investment has been liberalized at least as surely as-
indeed, even more surely than-trade, even domestic Mary for her part is likely
unharmed: If well advised by investment consultants, she has long since
dumped shares in Peter's employer for shares in other firms altogether-both
domestic and, increasingly, foreign.
But if all of this is so, then it presumably will not suffice, if our goal is to
ensure that the Marys share gains quite generally with Peters, simply to spread
new shares in misemploying firms to their erstwhile, now laid off employees.
To plug all the leaks, so to speak, as well as to diversify holdings by Peters
more generally and thus render their capital incomes more secure, we shall
want to link Peters to Marys via more firms than one. How to do that?
I think there are a number of options here, no one of which need be the
one. I'll accordingly resist the temptation to try to blueprint in detail every
such possible means, and instead shall sketch simply what I think is a
suggestive and promising multi-step general strategy. First, then, because the
patronage link between Peters and healthy, continuing domestic firms that
"outsource" their labor is particularly ethically salient and heuristically
compelling, begin with those. Set things up, that is to say, again rather as we
did in the RentSOP case above in III.B, now calling it something like, say, an
"OutsourceSOP " in Figure 4:
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FIGURE 4: INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF AN "OUTSOURCE"
SOP ARRANGEMENT
l of l
i
Outtoorco
Prmissry Note, Stock as Collatera
i II
Once again, of course, we find the same basic structure here as is found in
Figures 1, 2 and 3 above, with misemployed laborers rather than ongoing
employees, customers or "Alaskans" now standing in as our salient class of
patrons. The degree of patronage, however, will again track years of
employment just as in the ESOP-which seems intuitively attractive both
because the outsourced employee has invested more of his working life and
"specific human capital" into the firm and, flip-sidewise, because he has' less
to give now to other prospective employers. Other than this and the changed
patronage basis here ethically grounding the public benefit, the only new
wrinkle is simply that the benefits afforded to outsourcing firms by the
public-in the form, inter alia, of negotiated trade and investment
liberalization agreements-are conditioned upon share-spreading by the firms
to the laborers they lay off. The important point for present purposes is that,
just as in the other SOP examples, the firm in this case still finds itself debt-
financing on favorable terms in the interest of boosting its capacity to exploit
the newly exploitable resource that is a newly opened set of global markets,
and spreading ownership in itself-hence the benefits that accrue to its owners
by dint of its access to those markets-in the process.
But now, how about the foreign firms ... won't they be more difficult to
rope-in to the scheme than domestic firms? Well, here things become a little
more complicated, but not all that much once we think about it. Indeed the
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principal "complication" is simply that there are multiple means of doing
justice to Peter. One means would be to tax Marys with large holdings in
foreign firms, the proceeds to be used to purchase shares in the same foreign
firms, to be placed into SOP-styled "Peter accounts." A cognate and perhaps
more attractive (because non-taxing) means-though this would work more
effectively in respect of primary issuances than of purchases on the secondary
market-would be to condition investment liberalization (the continued
absence of capital controls) upon foreign firms' issuing a certain amount of
new stock to such "Peter accounts" per increment of stock acquired by
compatriot Marys.
Of course, foreign firms might be expected to protest that investment in
them by Marys would be rendered less attractive in consequence of the taxing
method; and thus would be illicitly disadvantaged relative to domestic
investment. But if we were to develop means of ensuring that it was only
indeed "Marys" whom we were thus taxing--e.g., by taxing capital gains
realized on foreign stock holdings only beyond some threshold-this would
simply amount to the unethical demand that Marys be permitted to unjustly
benefit at the expense of innocent Peters. Moreover, investments by Marys in
firms that abide by labor, environmental and other standards equivalent to
those observed by domestic firms could be exempted. 16 That of course raises
the other, cognate prospect I just mentioned, amounting to yet another means
by which to improve the relative justice-standings of Mary and Peter: Why not
condition trade and investment liberalization themselves upon all benefiting
firms' financing themselves at least in part through the SOP structure to enable
all Peters to share in the gains realized by Marys? That is to say, why not "go
national" or indeed "go global" with the full "OutsourceSOP "program itself?
Let's pursue that last line of thought for a moment. While at it, let's link
it up with the earlier mentioned matter of Marys who disinvest from
globalization-damaged, Peter-misemploying firms in order to reinvest not
abroad, but in other domestic firms to whose production processes Peter's
long-developed firm or sector-specific human capital is not suited. Let's also
link it up to the yet larger matter of income security and its relation to
investment diversification more generally: Might we not develop either a
national or, more ambitiously, multinational compact pursuant to which all
"Peters" nationwide or worldwide benefit through something like the SOP
structure in return for their "playing by the rules" or perhaps affording some
other form of national or international service? This might ring a bit grandiose
at present, but please bear with me a moment.
116. Note that this is not the same thing as conditioning trade liberalization upon trading
partners' subjecting their firms to the same labor, environmental and other regulatory standards as
those to which domestic firms are subjected. It is only to require that Marys who exploit such
differentials share the gains that they realize thereby with the Peters. Lest you worry that the
effect will nevertheless be the same, only differing in degree rather than kind by dint of the
Marys' then turning to invest more in domestic firms that also do not employ Peter, please read
on. For I aim next to close that loophole as well.
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Here, a bit more precisely, is what I have in mind: It seems to me
plausible to suggest that citizenship itself is a kind of patronage, even if
"thinner" than most other forms.1 17  It is an ongoing relation such as can
warrant, in some cases, the public conferral of at least some kinds of benefit.
At any rate "good citizenship" would seem so, such that everyone who "plays
by the rules," "works hard" or perhaps provides some kind of ongoing public
service, can be said to deserve some solicitude, perhaps even the guarantee of
some "basic minimum," from us all, would it not? Surely we all as a group, in
a sense, feel we owe a "hand up" to those among us who share our core values,
obey all our laws, seek useful employment and are nonetheless "down" by the
workings of fortune not fault. That seems to be what our oft-invoked
commitments to equal justice, equal worth, and equal dignity commit us to, at
the very least. And those commitments all jointly add up, not to a guaranteed
equality of citizens' ultimate outcomes, of course, since outcomes impound
efforts as well as opportunities, but at least to equality of real opportunity as
suggested above in the Introduction and Parts I and II.C. 1t8
I don't believe anyone will disagree with these truths-which more folk
than Americans seem to hold "self-evident."' 19 What we do sometimes
disagree about are the empirics of actual responsibility-the comparative
degrees to which chance and choice have determined particular citizens'
outcomes. I linger at some length upon practical means of disentangling these
intermingling "inputs" to citizens' "wealth functions" elsewhere. 120  For
117. Even if, in a liberal polity as that toward which our own approximates, an attenuated or
"thin" kind of patronage. The degree to which citizenship as a form of patronage is thin might
track the degree to which the polity's "theory of the good" is thin. A polity that acknowledges
"the priority of the right over the good," will be a polity which, qua polity, maintains but a "thin"
theory of the good-reserving "thicker" conceptions of what is to lead a good life to citizens as
individual "life-planning" agents. Citizenship itself accordingly would be but minimally defined,
in bare justice terms; and claims to basic resource minima would be rooted in the basic justice to
which every citizen is entitled as a citizen. To the degree that a polity departs from the minimal
liberal ideal, however - e.g., in the direction of a "civic republic" whose citizens deliberately
share certain "thicker" values additional to that of justice (e.g., the values of shared participation
and deliberation themselves, even notwithstanding the wishes of some not be take part of
deliberate) - the form of patronage to which citizenship itself amounts will correspondingly grow
"thicker." Being a citizen will involve closer relating with and value-sharing with one's fellow
citizens qua citizens. And it might then activate concerns we hold on behalf of others which are
grounded more in fellow-feeling now as well as in bare justice. See also Hockett, Whose
Ownership?, supra headnote, at 5-24 (discussing the degree to which the American polity appears
to incorporate civic republican as well as classical liberal values).
118. See, e.g., supra, Part II.C.
119. See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note headnote at 29-56 for support. That is
where I endeavor to locate and overlapping consensus among our dominant political traditions-a
consensus that converges upon a shared ideal I label that of an "efficient equal-opportunity
republic." See also Hockett, Just Insurance, supra headnote at 142-73; and Hockett, The Deep
Grammar of Distribution, supra note 75, at 1179. The "self-evidence" remark, of course, alludes
to THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Declaration by the Representatives of the United States ofAmerica, in
General Congress Assembled July 4, 1776, reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 19
(Martin E. Segal ed., 1984).
120. See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote, at 36-51.
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present purposes, however, it will do simply to recall what we reminded
ourselves of above at II.C: Namely, that (a) the more innocent a prospective
beneficiary of a share-spreading program, (b) the less well endowed that
beneficiary already is, and (c) the more readily viewed as an ethically
exogenous resource or material opportunity-upon which the beneficiary must
expend effort in order to transform it into personally experienced utility-a
spread item is, the easier it is to perceive publicly augmented spreading as a
redress of ill-fortune. The easier in such case it is to view public action as
vindicating equal opportunity rather than simply doling out "hand-outs." And
that is all the more so when public augmentation takes the form of tax
breaks. 1
21
In that light, it would seem that we might try a yet more generalized
variation on the ESOP, this one geared toward benefiting those in particular
who are young, lacking in resources, or good citizens who play by the rules.
(We might begin by targeting those who benefit their country or the global
polity through something akin to AmeriCorps services. We might indeed think
about instituting, perhaps through the U.N., something like a
"WorldCorps.") 122  We can readily ensure that beneficiaries meet these
criteria-criteria which will reflect and in effect define the form of patronage
that we believe ethically to underwrite the benefit. 123 And we can financially
structure the arrangement so as to ensure that beneficiaries benefit only by
working, rather as happens in the case of the ESOP.
Here is how: First, establish a national or multinational trust, a sort of
cross between various nations' national pension trusts and the humbler ESOP
trust schematized at Part II. We might call this trust something like, say, the
national or international "Citizen Stock Ownership Plan" or "CitSOP" Trust.
Second, open individual "citizen trusts" or "accounts" for every citizen-
perhaps upon each citizen's reaching adulthood (in the "accounts" case), or at
birth (in the "trusts" case) as has recently been begun in the U.K.1 24 These
individual CitSOP accounts could be administered rather as was envisaged in
connection with the "USA" accounts proposed in the late 1990s, by President
Clinton of the U.S., or the Social Security "personal accounts" proposed
somewhat more recently, or even the accounts proposed by the IMF's own co-
121. See supra Part III.C.
122. The United States' first large-scale post-Homesteading era education-spreading-
hence , "human capital" spreading-programs began with veterans as beneficiaries. Hockett,
Jefferson Republic, supra headnote, at 144-46. How fitting it would be, to recognize other forms
of service in similar ways.
123. Note that we do this already with federal home finance and higher education
assistance. We employ both financial need criteria and law-abidingness criteria. See id. at 97.
124. See BBC News, Blair Banks on Baby Savings Scheme, April 27, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk politics/1297324.stm (referring to Prime Minister Blair's Child
Trust Fund - or more popularly, "baby bonds" - plan implemented in 2001); Democratic
Leadership Council, Idea of the Week: KidSave, Oct. 13, 2000, http://www.dlc.org/ndol-ci.cfm?
contentid=2372&kaid=131&subid=207 (referring to Former Nebraska Senator Bob Kerrey's
"KidSave Accounts" proposed at the turn of the past century).
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designer, Lord Keynes, nearly 70 years ago. 1
25
Now, let the national or multinational CitSOP Trust borrow from lending
institutions just as firms' ESOP trusts do, and let them use the proceeds of the
loans to purchase newly-issued, dividend-yielding common stock from firms;
grant participating firms and lending institutions, in turn, more or less the same
tax incentives as they are afforded in connection with US ESOP arrangements.
Let the national or international CitSOP trusts, in turn, pledge the purchased
stock as collateral12 6 and steadily pay down the debts to the lenders out of, say,
the tax revenue brought in from participating firms. Let the full set of
arrangements, in short, look something like Figure 5:
125. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, HOW TO PAY FOR THE WAR (1940), for Keyne's
visionary and indeed prophetic proposal. See also, e.g., Hockett, Mission-Creep, supra headnote
(Keyne's role in designing the Fund). Compare Investment Company Institute, President Clinton
Introduces Universal Savings Accounts, Apr. 16, 1999, http://www.ici.org/issues/ret/arc-
leg/99_presusas.html; The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks of the President
on Universal Savings Accounts, Apr. 14, 1999, http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/NewhtmlU
19990414-3020.html; Urban Institute, Matching Private Savings with Federal Dollars, Nov. 1,
1999, http://www.urban.org/publications/309272.htm; and American Acadamy of Actuaries,
USA Accounts, http://actuary.org/pdf/pension/usaccounts.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2007)
(explaining President Clinton's "universal savings accounts," or "USAs," proposed in 1999), with
The White House, Strengthening Social Security for Future Generations,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/social-security/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2007), and CBS News,
Bush Pushes Private Accounts, May 4, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/05/
04/politics/main692991.shtml (explaining a structure of private accounts, now without
government income support, figured into George W. Bush's 2005 State of the Union address).
126. Though of course this also might be deemed unnecessary in, e.g., the United States in
view of the full faith and credit enjoyed by a federal institution. Indeed, even were the trust to
function as a government sponsored entity (a GSE), it would in effect be viewed as being fully
eighty percent as credit-worthy as the federal government itself for purposes of bank capital
adequacy regulation. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A (2007).
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FIGURE 5: INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A CITSOP
ARRANGEMENT
~of
Note
sso Note,
This looks familiar. Yes, it's Figure 1 (or 2 or 3 or 4) again, save again
with some differing persons and entities-apart from issuing firms and
lenders-involved, once more in light of the distinct form of patronage that we
are rewarding. The only complications found here but not there (in the ESOP,
CuSOP, RentSOP and OutsourceSOP cases) have to do with how precisely we
decide to define the salient patronage form. Hence, for example, if we begin
with national or multinational service of some sort as the salient patronage
form, then the amount of stock released over time to the individual
beneficiary's CitSOP account will track her hours or weeks or years of service.
If, on the other hand, law-abiding citizenship itself is the patronage category,
then stock amounts will rise simply with years of citizenship--rather as one's
US Social Security or cognate national pension benefit elsewhere (e.g.,
Chile1 27) rises with time spent at work.
We might also, of course, stratify patronage subtypes in this case, such
that law-abiding citizenship alone entitles the beneficiary to some basic
minimum of stock released per quarter, national or international service of one
sort entitles her to some amount more, national or international service of
another sort entitles her to a yet larger increment more, and so on. Finally,
127. For a good sampling of the aims, ambitions and operations of various national pension
programs, see THE ECONOMICS OF PENSIONS: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCE (Salvador Valdes-Prieto ed., 1997).
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insofar as it is opportunity deficits that have activated our concern, we might-
but also might "not--"needs test" one or more of the benefits here, perhaps
applying a graduated discount factor to entitled benefits as personal wealth
rises.1 28  Were we to do that, we might consider misemployment by an
"outsourcing" firm itself to constitute such a need, in effect growing the
CitSOP directly out of the OutsourceSOP . (In such case again we would
presumably verify eligibility by means similar to those employed presently in
connection with statutory "adjustment relief.")
There are of course many variations and gradations that we can consider
and experiment with in all of this, for again the aim here is to establish the
plausibility and attractiveness of the general idea rather than to lock us in to
one particular blueprint. The important points for present purposes, then, are
more fundamental in nature: The first is that the basic model can perspicuously
accommodate any form of patronage-any form of ethically deserving status
such as might politically sanction benefit conferral-that we envisage. The
second point is that it can do so while enabling us to confer the benefit in a
manner that both (a) spreads firm-ownership, and (b) does so by means that
respect both our core values and our endowment sensibilities as rehearsed
above in II.C.
The third point is that we can, though we need not, in one way or another
either wholly or partly condition trade and investment liberalization upon
participation by other nations in some such multilateral program as this. Doing
so requires only already well-to-do Marys, not erstwhile penurious Pauls, to
share the surpluses that they glean in consequence of globalization with
recently and faultlessly "outsourced" Peters. (We can condition continued
globalization, that is to say, upon everyone's truly gaining.)
And, finally, the fourth point, to which I turn now in a bit more detail, is
that the national or international CitSOP idea naturally fans out into a broader
consideration that deserves a bit more play: I mean the fact that the Peters who
elicit our concern, possessing as they generally do only one, comparatively
undiversifiable form of capital- "human capital""are inherently subject to
more income risk than are the Marys, whose firm-share-holdings are readily
diversified. Might we work, then, to render our compensated Peter's new
capital form as secure as is Mary's?
One particular advantage enjoyed by the CitSOP idea that is not enjoyed
to the same degree by the CuSOP, RentSOP, and single firm OutsourceSOP
ideas is the automaticity of the CitSOP's diversification of acquired stocks. If
a broad variety of firms nationally or transnationally were to participate in the
CitSOP program, beneficiaries could perforce receive shares in a broad array
of firms. In the earlier-rehearsed CuSOP, RentSOP, and OutsourceSOP cases,
128. A limiting case, then, might be that of the offspring of wealthy families, who perhaps
would not quality for any benefit of this particular (CitSOP) sort. It might, however, on the other
hand be deemed preferable not to needs test at all, on more or less the same political popularity
grounds as the U.S. SSI's abstention from needs testing.
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by contrast, diversification would ride upon more accidental factors-viz., the
number of different corporate firms that the particular beneficiary regularly
patronized as customer (voluntarily, involuntarily, or in between), the number
of such rent-extracting firms in more or less close proximity to which the
beneficiary lived, or the number of firms-typically but one-fore which the
beneficiary labored. How, then, in more detail might we design SOP-like or
SOP-complementing arrangements that might optimally diversify holdings
among all SOP beneficiaries irrespective of SOP-type?
A variety of methods might be employed. I'll model two very simple,
exemplary cases here. The first model might be called that of the "SOP
Mutual." Various SOP trusts would convey their primary issuer stock holdings
to an intermediary, which in return, would convey shares in itself of equal
value to the trusts. 129 The intermediary (and now secondary issuer) would be,
in effect, a mutual fund whose (initial) members were SOP trusts. 130
Subsequently the SOP trusts would, rather than gradually releasing sponsoring
issuers' securities to their beneficiaries' individual accounts over time, release
SOP Mutual shares instead. Shares of the latter sort would also serve, where
shares collateralize loans used for the purchase of primary issuer stock, in
place of the latter as collateral. Diagramatically, then, things would look like
Figure 6:
129. Fund shares would be valued as are any mutual fund's shares. Individual issuer shares
would be valued as are any issuer's-by "the market" in the case of publicly valued firms,
pursuant to the "cashflow" method in the case of closely held firms. See generally TOM
COPELAND ET AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 131-
297 (3d ed. 2000). I ignore here the question of means of avoiding imprecisions occasioned by
market fluctuations, account indeterminacies, etc., as there seem to be no difficulties specific to
the present case and not already dealt with by familiar means in other investment company
contexts.
130. And, as we'll see in a moment, SOP trust beneficiaries.
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Figure 6: Institutional/Financial Structure of a SOP with SOP Mutual
Arrangement
Error!
Nat
raece'
1 Prom sory Noe Matua ("Secondary")
Shares es Collateral
imal y R epament Sr(Mta)Shares
Prir ser( rm) Shares
De sPad Dwn
It seems worth noting that the SOP Trusts participating in SOP Mutual
arrangements could be of all types-ESOPs, CuSOPs, RentSOPs,
OutsourceSOP s, even CitSOPs with good reason.13' And the more SOP types
and SOPs, of course, the greater the degree of diversity, hence the lesser
quantum of value at risk, that would be faced by our SOP beneficiaries-our
"Peters." We might then have here a bit of the "best of both worlds," so to
speak. We would be both fostering patronage relations between persons and
firms-since benefits ride upon such relations-and dissipating the income
risk that attends patronage concentration.
An advantage of the SOP Mutual model is it enables SOP beneficiaries-
not to mention such lenders as whose loans are collateralized by SOP Trust-
held stocks-to reap the benefits of diversification even before they become
legal, as distinguished from beneficial owners. If, however, we found that we
131. For example, were an insufficient variety of firm types participating in CitSOP
arrangements.
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had or we wished to forgo that advantage for some reason, we could mutualize
at the individual beneficiary level rather than at the SOP Trust level. We
might, for example, condition beneficiaries' qualifying for the SOP benefit
upon their agreement to diversify their holdings for some period of time. Or
we might differently tax gains upon individually owned primary issues and
secondary (mutual) stock. Or, yet again, what seems more likely, a gradually
growing degree of financial understanding enjoyed by citizens holding
gradually growing portfolios of securities 132 presumably would prompt our
SOP beneficiaries to better diversify their legally owned holdings. (We might
even provide, facilitate or otherwise encourage the provision of such
counseling.)
In all events, diagrammatically, in Figure 7, things would look rather as
they do in Figure 5, save that now arrows would link, individual SOP
beneficiaries and ordinary mutual funds, not SOP Trusts and SOP Mutuals:
FIGURE 7: INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A SOP WITH
ARRANGEMENT WITH DIVERSIFICATION ACHIEVED PRIVATELY
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And we might imagine, of course, ordinary mutual funds serving both in
132. We might even subsidize or require the latter perhaps in the form of benefit
conditionality-some baseline degree of financial counseling, as we do in the case of our federal
home- and education-finance programs. See HockeRt, Jeffersonian Republic, supra headnote, at
112, 151.
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their current capacities and as SOP Mutuals as in Figure 8:
FIGURE 8: INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A SOP WITH SOP
MUTUAL ARRANGEMENT AND PRIVATELY ACHIEVED DIVERSIFICATION AS
WELL
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There seems no reason, then, why we might not achieve optimal
diversification among our growingly owning citizens even while rewarding
their multiple ongoing patronage relations with a perhaps somewhat lesser
variety of firms.
V. THE ROLE OF THE IFIS
Everything that I have been attempting to visualize and think through in
Part IV implicates the international financial institutions (IFI). A problem at
this juncture, however, is that it does not implicate them in solely one way.
What role or roles the IFIs should play-and indeed what roles which IFIs
should play-will ride significantly upon how we determine to structure and
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institute a system of OutsourceSOP arrangements, CitSOP arrangements, or
both. And I have repeatedly abstained from committing to any one way of
proceeding with these arrangements, in view of the exploratory, "thought
experimenting" nature of the present project.
The best way to think about the role of the IFIs in a manner consistent
with our present purposes is to divide the inquiry into two stages. In the first
stage, I'll say a bit more of a general nature about why and how the IFIs are
implicated. For what is to be said here will both (a) be applicable to any
particular role or set of roles we envisage for the IFIs and (b) constrain how we
ought to envisage those roles themselves. In the second stage I'll sketch the
IFIs' more specifically, while still in broad enough outline as to remain
appropriately responsive to the plurality of options left open by the "thought
experimenting" done in Part IV.
A. Why & How They are Implicated, Generally Speaking
The proposals visualized over the course of Part IV are all, at their most
basic level, financial in nature. They also are designed with a view to better
apportion the benefits and burdens of globalization. The central idea is to
spread what I've called ethically exogenous benefits and burdens more
equitably, in keeping with our core opportunity egalitarian values as
adumbrated in Parts I and II.C. The aim is also to do so, in keeping with our
methods-constraining endowment dispositions, as briefly rehearsed in II.C, via
the mechanisms through which globalization-benefited business firms finance
themselves. By taxbreak-assisting corporate debt-finance in return for
corporate share-spreading (which of course is capital-spreading) or by
conditioning firms' receipt of rent-like benefits (such as those occasioned by
globalization) upon share-spreading, the SOP plans harness finance and
globalization themselves to spread globalization's own benefits more widely.
And the benefits themselves are financial in nature: They are corporate
securities.
Now, precisely for these reasons, the suggestions made in Part IV fall
squarely within what I have argued in a number of other places to constitute
the emerging mandate of the principal IFIs-the Bretton Woods institutions in
particular. 133 .What do I mean by "emerging mandate" here? I mean two
things: one relatively broad, the other more narrow in sweep. What I mean
broadly is that the IFIs' legally mandated and indeed pragmatically necessary
role is, at it most generally characterized, to facilitate sustainable global
economic integration from that integration process's specifically financial
nodes.' 34  This is, of course, a complex and evolving mandate, not least
because global financial markets and practices themselves are both very
complex and rapidly evolving.
133. See articles cited supra headnote. More specific cites to particular articles will follow.
134. See Hockett, Mission-Creep, supra headnote.
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The mandate originally involved the IMF in overseeing and maintaining
the global currency regime upon which product market integration depended
and the IBRD in financing postwar reconstruction and new infrastructure
development both directly and indirectly. 135 Since the 1970s, 1980s, and,
especially, the later 1990s, the mandate has steadily come to involve rather
more, largely owing to the IFIs' (and indeed globalization's) successes in
carrying out 'earlier stages of the mandate. The 'IMF's comparatively recent
domestic structural adjustment and global financial market monitoring roles,
for example, have been gradually transforming it into a critical determinant of
the legal and regulatory infrastructures not only of cross-border financial
transactions, but unavoidably of domestic financial arrangements as well.
136
The Bank, for its part, increasingly-and again, unavoidably-treats domestic
pension and social insurance arrangements as critical components of the
infrastructures necessary for steady and sustained economic development. 137
I have argued elsewhere at length that all of these developments were, at
least in broad outline, both foreseeable and indeed foreseen during the IFIs'
founding era in the mid 1940s and, thus, were legally provided for in the
constitutive documents, acts, and shared understandings from which the
institutions grew.' 38 The founders recognized, and indeed actively sought, the
gradual integration of world product and service markets, in the interest of both
greater prosperity among and closer integration between national societies
themselves. 139 Accordingly, they also saw the need of a pragmatically
adjustable role for international collaboration in the realm of finance and its
regulation, both because financial services are themselves among the services
that trade and, yet more importantly, because finance, financial markets, and
financial products are critically determinative of the operation, integration, and
stably sustainable growth of markets more generally.
140
Now the project of this Essay, I think, falls quite clearly within this same
province both as a prudential and as an ethical matter. Prudentially speaking,
as I trust we all recognize, global trade and investment liberalization have
entered more turbulent political waters in the last decade or so. The process's
perceived "losers" have been growing more numerous, more vocal, or both.
And it seems they are beginning to be heard and heeded, not just by activists
and agitators but by leaders and legislators as well. If the process of global
economic integration is to continue and we are to avoid backsliding into a
1930s-style retrenchment, then, it would seem we'll do well to find a means of
making more stakeholders among those who currently grow increasingly
135. The IBRD indirectly financed postwar construction and new infrastructure
development by effectively encouraging private lending, in addition to supplying funds directly.
See id. See also Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote.
136. See Hockett, Mission-Creep, supra headnote.
137. Id. See also Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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disenfranchised and disenchanted.
As argued over the course of Parts II through IV, one very attractive and
widely appreciable means of making more stakeholders is the making of more
shareholders-holders of shares in the very firms that now benefit by
globalization. This form of stake is financial in itself, in the sense that shares
are financial assets par excellence. And the means I am proposing for
spreading such shares are of course financial as well. So both in respect of
ends-sustaining continued global market integration by better spreading such
integration's financial benefits-and in respect of means-financial
engineering means-what I am proposing clearly implicates the IFIs and their
evolving mandates as broadly considered.
This is what I mean, then, "more broadly" in saying the IFRs are
implicated by what I'm proposing. What do I mean more narrowly? Well, as I
also have argued elsewhere, the IFIs' proper roles in facilitating sustainable
global economic integration are best viewed as falling within four quadrants
formed by two axes. 141 The first axis runs between what I call "programs" and
"policies." This divide is rooted in the structures of the IFIs' organic enabling
documents themselves and, principally involves the IFIs in developing
"policies" meant to encourage and facilitate particular kinds of state
"program. ' 142
The second axis runs between "opportunity" and "risk," which amount to
the financial faces of globalization's benefits and burdens, respectively.
143
This axis is rooted, quite simply, in the functional roles played by finance in
human affairs. 144 The IFIs' mandates are best interpreted as charges to the IFs
to adopt policies which encourage and facilitate state programs that not only
increase opportunity and decrease risk, but that work specifically to spread
what I've called "ethically exogenous" opportunity and risk, to return to the
language of Part I above. 1
45
The program/policy and opportunity/risk axes form four quadrants
according to which we can readily classify and interpret a variety of
opportunity- and risk-spreading state programs encouraged and facilitated by
141. See Hockett, Mission-Creep, supra headnote.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. On the benefit side, finance literally amounts to opportunity by enabling people,
through the exercise of diligence, to realize their potential value-adding ideas. In effect, this is
precisely what micro-loans, small business loans, corporate finance, and venture capital all
provide. On the burden side, finance provides a means of trading, sharing, or more thinly
spreading what would otherwise be concentrated risk. This is one reason why insurance
companies are considered financial institutions. Of course, it is also observed not only in
derivative and other hedging markets but even in the more garden variety corporate securities
markets themselves - a principal role of which is assist firms' owners in diversifying their
investments and, thus, lessening their financial risk. See generally ROBERT HOCKETT, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON FINANCE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL REGULATION
(forthcoming 2008).
145. See Hockett, Mission-Creep, supra headnote; Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote.
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specific IFI policies. I've done so elsewhere, in addition to sketching and, in
some cases, detailing further such programs and policies that it seems to me
ought to be tried.146
So, for example, land reform, basic health, literacy, and education
programs carried out within states are ethically exogenous opportunity-
spreading programs; the Bank in particular has developed policies in favor of
encouraging and indeed facilitating such programs.1 47 The Fund's and the
Bank's developing interest in eradicating corruption, and even in fostering
democracy, both in governments and in firm governance, can likewise be
interpreted. 148 Social insurance programs run by states, of course, amount to
ethically exogenous risk-spreading programs. And the IFIs' recent attentions
to "social safety nets" amount to IFI policy developments along these lines. 149
(I have been proposing additional, market-based such programs in other
venues.)
Where, then, do the SOP suggestions of Part IV fit in here? To a degree,
they straddle the boundaries, occupying portions of all four quadrants. This is
most obvious in respect of the opportunity/risk axis, where the straddle is, in a
sense, conceptually inevitable. 'In respect of the program/policy axis, the
straddle is contingent upon our decision as to how to proceed. I'll therefore
say a bit here about the opportunity/risk axis, leaving the matter of program
and policy to subpart B below.
What I mean in speaking of an opportunity and risk straddle in the case of
the SOP plans of Part IV here is fairly simple and straightforward: It is that
spreading shares in globalization-benefited firms to faultless outsourced Peters
is to spread both ethically exogenous risk and ethically exogenous opportunity.
It is to spread such risk because Peter no longer need bear this risk-which is,
again, by hypothesis ethically exogenous (that's what we mean in calling him
"faultless")-alone. The risk to people like Peter-who might, when too old
to fully retool, unforeseeably lose income owing to the sudden hiring of
desperate Pauls who can work for much lower pay in much poorer countries
with much lower costs of living-is now mitigated. It is mitigated by
compensation paid Peter by benefiting Mary, now made to share some of her
windfall gains. So the presently concentrated burdens wrought by
globalization are de-concentrated; they are spread. And they are spread
precisely by spreading a hitherto also concentrated benefit-namely, the
windfall gains gleaned by Mary.
The aforementioned benefit spreading, which here takes the form of firm-
share spreading, also amounts to a form of ethically exogenous opportunity
146. See Hockett, Mission-Creep, supra headnote; Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote.
See also Hockett, Just Insurance, supra headnote; Robert Hockett, Gaming as Microinsurance
(working paper, 2007).
147. See Hocket, Mission-Creep, supra headnote.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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spreading. It is opportunity spreading in the quite simple sense that to own
shares in firms that benefit from globalization is to own shares in future profits.
Peters will glean future dividends or capital gains (or both) that they would not
have gleaned before. (They might even use some of these to finance
"retooling" of themselves through vocational training, if relatively young.)
Share spreading of this sort also is ethically exogenous opportunity spreading,
in the sense that it is financed, in effect, by recouping some of the windfall
gains realized by the Marys.
The SOP structures described over Part IV, then, amount to means of
facilitating the sharing across persons of ethically exogenous opportunity and
risk, in a manner that both increases the number of stakeholders in and
decreases the degree of inequitable victimization of, global economic
integration. It is, accordingly, just the sort of thing that I have argued
elsewhere to fall quite squarely within the bailiwick of proper IFI concern.
But now, precisely what form of concern? Are the SOP arrangements
described in Part IV best viewed as primarily a matter of state program that
IFIs should adopt policies of encouraging and perhaps facilitating? Or are we
considering here the sort of program that either must be, or at any rate would
best be, administered by some transnational institution or institutions,
including one or more of the IFIs acting in one or another capacity? That
question takes us to more specific consideration of precisely what role the IFIs
are apt to play in any global SOPs program. Here, I tend to think that "path
dependence," determined in part by already existing analogical precedent and
in part by an already developing institutional backdrop, is likely to play an
important role.
B. How the IFIs are Implicated, Specifically Speaking
Since there seems to be no question but that the IFIs both have good
reason to take interest in the prospect of a global SOPs program and are
authorized to do so, our principal remaining question is what form that interest
should take. Given the particular interests at stake and the institutional
environment already in place, I think that the principal role for the IFIs will be,
first, inventive and advocative; second, coordinative; and third, monitory. In
the remainder of this Part, I'll explain what I mean here and why I think it is
most likely, while also, in keeping with the more exploratory aims of this
Essay, leaving open the prospect that IFI involvement might take some other
shape.
The IFIs, then, should first work to design and urge their members to
initiate OutsourceSOP s and, perhaps, CitSOPs domestically. Second, they
should propose, host, and facilitate international cooperation in coordinating
SOP policies across jurisdictions in a manner that encourages safe participation
and diversification of holdings by SOP beneficiaries. And third, they should
add, to their already active surveillance agendas, the regulation and monitoring
of SOP trusts-this with a view to protecting beneficiaries and third parties
from familiar forms of expropriation and exploitation from opportunistic
2008]
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fiduciaries-pursuant to their general role in facilitating coordinated finance-
regulatory policies worldwide.
In employing ordinal-"first," "second" and "third"-terminology here, I
intend to convey more than expository ordering. I mean quite literal,
programmatically temporal ordering as well. I think the ordering of exposition
is not only heuristically natural, but also replicates the optimal sequencing of
IFI involvement in any global SOPs agenda. I'll explain why as I proceed in
explaining my position here.
First, as to design and advocacy: It might of course be wondered why the
IFIs need design or advocacy here at all. Do individual member states-
particularly those with substantial populations of those I have been calling
"Peters"-not face sufficient incentives already to institute systems of
OutsourceSOP s and even CitSOPs? After all, it is their Peters who are
unjustly harmed by outsourcing; it is their treaties that are making this possible
and it is their function to facilitate exogenous opportunity and risk-sharing
among their own citizens. Furthermore, are states not perfectly capable of
doing this on their own on a state by state basis? For again, after all, (a) it is
for them themselves to encourage SOP financing on the part of firms by
trimming their tax take from firms that do so or by conditioning trade
liberalization on share issuance to outsourced employees. Moreover (b), it is
they who will have to determine who among their citizenries qualifies for the
benefit, as is currently the case with more familiar adjustment assistance. And
finally (c) there is already an extensive infrastructure of bank trust departments
and investment companies---especially mutual funds-that would seem most
likely to supply the SOP-requisite trust accounts (we're not likely to wish to
"reinvent the wheel" here); and these operate under domestic regulatory
arrangements.
The reply to these questions and observations is of course yes, and that is
quite helpful to know for at least one reason: Namely, that states can begin
designing and instituting such programs as these to render globalization more
unambiguously good for their citizenries, without waiting for others to do
so. 150 Nevertheless, things are a bit more complicated than I have thus far
suggested in a number of respects. And it is these complications that constitute
the principal points of entry for the IFIs.
For one thing, most simply and generally, it will be much better for the
cause of sustainable globalization for all states with sizable populations of
Peters to design and institute SOP-type programs of the kind sketched above in
Part IV. That is so both for the justice- and prudence-grounded reasons
elaborated in Parts I and II.C, and for the more globalization-specific reasons
discussed just above in Part V.A. More is straightforwardly better where more
just distribution is concerned.151 The IFIs, whose first mission is to facilitate
150. Hence my proposals in Hockett, Stock Ownership Plans, supra headnote.
151. For more on the straightforward betterness I have in mind here, see Hockett, Whose
Ownership?, supra headnote. For a formal proof of the claim, see Robert Hockett, Market
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precisely such continued globalization as mentioned, bear a natural interest in
encouraging members to do domestically what is necessary to further that
transnational purpose. That is indeed precisely why they encourage, as noted
just above in Part V.A, the development of "social safety nets" that the
OutsourceSOP and CitSOP would partly constitute.
Furthermore, within some policies Marys might be as influential as
Peters, if not indeed more so, and their perceived self-interests might not be
what most of us would call "enlightened." What is more, Peters in many
jurisdictions might well believe that their only remedy from continued
outsourcing is to push back against globalization itself. They might not realize
that there are more direct and better tailored, less globalization-threatening
means of addressing their just complaints.
The IFIs can accordingly serve a most useful agenda-setting or -
influencing role within polities where our "everyone gains," Part IV SOP
solution has not yet been hit upon or become mainstream. By adding a
salutary voice within polities, then, and moreover by adding an impartial,
transnational voice, the IFIs can play a critically salutary role in the spreading
of SOP programs worldwide. That, again, in turn will facilitate the stable and
steady continuance of distributively just market-integration to which the IFIs
are, as it were, constitutionally committed.
It also bears emphasis that some of the assumptions embedded in the
questions with which I introduced the present discussion require more nuance
if the questions are not actually to be misleading. And this takes us directly to
the second, more than merely advocative role that the IFIs seem likely to play
in connection with the instituting of any global SOPs program.
Here, in essence, is the proverbial rub: It is true enough that national
governments might be doing the actual taxbreak---encouraging or conditional
requiring of SOP-financing by firms. And it is true that they'll also, in all
likelihood, be doing the monitoring of claimants to beneficiary status of SOP
programs, with a view to those claimants' bona fide "faultlessly outsourced"
status. Finally, it is also true there already is an extensive, privately provided
infrastructure of bank trust departments and investment companies in place
which is likely to be utilized in the creation of SOP trust accounts and SOP
beneficiary accounts. But, largely owing too the success of global financial
market integration itself, what individual states do which bears upon the
financing of firms and the operating of financial intermediaries increasingly
affects persons who reside beyond their borders.
General Motors, Microsoft, Unisys, and other large American
corporations are not owned solely by American Marys; nor are Daimler,
Phillips or Unilever owned solely by Europeans, or Toyota and Sony by
Japanese. Firms increasingly offer their shares worldwide, and the savings and
Completeness, Market Neutrality, and Ethically Cognizable Efficiency: An Ordinal Equivalence
Theorem (working paper, 2007).
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investment portfolios are increasingly held across borders.1 52 This all means,
among other things, that what a particular state encourages or requires firms
over which it has jurisdiction to do, increasingly affects non-nationals, as well
as nationals. In turn, that means not only non-national Marys over whom a
government lacks jurisdiction might feel differently than national Marys about
having to share gains with national Peters--especially if it is easier for national
Peters to gain beneficiary status than, say, Mary's nation's Peters: It also
means nationally and non-nationally located firms can fare differently
according as Marys "vote with their feet"-their investment moneys.
Differential faring of this sort would be inimical to the ideals of global market
integration. And what is more, differences of treatment of primary-issuing
firms and financial intermediaries nation by nation would tend to discourage
global diversification of holdings, a necessary predicate to optimal asset
security among the world's shareholders.
I trust that I needn't continue with this line of observation. : For a global
SOPs plan to be perceived as fair and to work optimally, it will have to treat all
global Peters and Marys as close to alike and impartially as possible. And that
means that there is a role for impartial international organizations to coordinate
efforts among nations, to harmonize substantive standards, and procedural
implementation. And this is, of course, yet another role that the IFIs-
especially the Fund now-already play.
Insofar as globalization is truly a global community project, then, and
insofar as this project implicates something like a global SOPs program by
way of smoother and therefore continuer of the project's progress, it calls for
coordinative assistance from the same institutions that assist with coordinating
the other policies, programs, and processes of global integration. In the present
context, that means the IFIs. So, in addition to advocating the coordinated
adoption of SOP programs by member states and supporting the design and
fine-tuning of such programs through their research and related expertise, the
IFIs will constitute natural fora for the coordinating itself-the coordinating of
substantive standards, implementary and operational strategies, and the like.
This takes us to the third and final "phase" of the most likely course of
sequenced IFI involvement.
Perhaps above all else, the kind of coordinating that many of the IFIs and
especially the IMF do now is the coordinating of regulation. 153 The financial
services industry, as we have long known, is particularly vulnerable to
occasional outbreaks of hyper-speculative and opportunistic behavior on the
part both of fiduciaries and of others trading on their own accounts. All of
these are people some of whom sometimes find the temptation to make a quick
buck, often through sophisticated means not readily detectable even by
experienced regulators let alone uninformed, non-expert clients, difficult to
152. See, e.g., HAL S. ScoTr, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND
REGULATION (14th ed. 2007).
153. See Hockett, Mission-Creep, supra headnote.
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resist. And when such things happen, not only can innocent parties' life
savings be wiped out with little more than a keystroke, but systemic third party
effects can be devastating as well.
154
It is precisely for these reasons-the special vulnerability of inexpert
clients, the systemic effects on the wider economy and thus uninvolved third
parties, and the high money stakes-that even many traditionally anti-
regulatory, politically "conservative" parties recognize the need for at least
financial regulation. 55 Such reasons also, together with the need to coordinate
regulatory strategies in a world whose financial markets are more and more
integrated even while regulation remains national and polycentric, underwrite
the role of the IFIs in researching, developing, and facilitating the smooth
operation of the global finance-regulatory architecture.
You see where this is going: A global SOPs program would make
substantial shareholders of a vastly large number of people worldwide. Firms
worldwide will increasingly come to be owned, in varyingly sized parts, by
virtually all of the world's adult inhabitants. Their shares will be held and
managed by financial intermediaries, which will accordingly hold power and
face temptations of kinds quite familiar but on a scale vastly larger than before.
The final role of the IFIs in connection with any global SOPs program,
then, will be a straightforward extension of---or rather, augmentation of-what
probably is currently their best known role: In a world that increasingly looks
like a global shareholder society-in which national citizens transnationally
hold shares in transnational firms in accounts with transnationally operating
financial intermediaries-the IFIs will have to assist national regulators in
protecting their shareholder citizens, as well as the global financial system qua
system. When we get there, of course, things will look much as they do now,
"only moreso."
CONCLUSION
We have covered a good bit of ground here, probably more than enough
to warrant leaving off for the present. Perhaps ironically, however, we have
only just begun. For as mentioned a number of times over the course of this
Essay, the aim has been more exploratory than anything else. The processes of
global market integration have been remarkably successful to date, particularly
when measured against the backdrop of those world conditions that determined
visionary world leaders in the middle 1940s on our present course. Those
processes also have brought many benefits to many people, and continue doing
so-including many of the world's most disadvantaged people, and its most
unjustly disadvantaged people.
154. Witness, by way of particularly recent example, current turmoil across financial
markets generally rooted in the particular decisions of a few overeager subprime mortgage
lenders several years ago. Such examples can of course be proliferated from decade to decade.
155. Even Ronald Reagan, the fellow who brought you "government is not the solution,
government is the problem," is said to have extolled the virtues of the SEC.
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But global market integration is also occasioning losses too, including
unjust losses. And unless we find means of addressing these, the world is apt
not only to remain less just than it could be but is also vulnerable to
backsliding in the unsatisfactory direction from whence we've come. It seems
to me that the best means of addressing these losses-best as measured both
against our motivating core ideals and against our feasibility-constraining
endowment sensibilities-are financial in nature. It also seems to me, just as
the project of globalization is a global project, so is the project of rendering
globalization more just and sustainable a global project. It is a project in which
global institutions must play a critical role; since it is also a financial project, it
is a project in which our global financial institutions-our IFIs-will play a
critical role.
The precise contours of that role-or those roles-will of course ride in
part on the precise contours of the programs we ultimately devise. I hope in
the foregoing pages at least to have sketched a plausible direction in which that
devising might proceed.
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